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ISSUER QUALITY AND THE CREDIT CYCLE, EUROPEAN EVIDENCE 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this thesis is to link patterns of corporate debt financing in Europe to time-
series variation in the pricing of credit risk.  The purpose is to show that the credit quality of 
corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms and this deterioration forecasts low 
excess returns to corporate bondholders. Further, empirical findings on issuer quality are 
used to investigate forces driving time-variation in expected corporate bond returns.  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data sample includes all public non-financial companies which are headquartered in 
Europe and have a market capitalization of 100 million euros or more. In addition bond data 
for German Government Bonds and high yield bond indexes are used. The period when the 
high yield bond index data has been available, 1998-2011, the annually measured company 
sample consists of 2,015 companies and 14,143 firm years. Quarterly dataset consists of 
1,336 companies and 25,567 individual quarterly observations from January 2001 to 
September 2011. To test the hypotheses, time-series measures of debt issuer quality are 
formed. After that several ordinary least square (OLS) regressions are conducted in order to 
test the validity of the hypotheses. 
RESULTS 
The empirical result of this thesis shows that when issuer quality is low high yield corporate 
bonds subsequently underperform risk-free German Government Bonds of the same 
maturity. Decline in issuer quality uncovers a striking degree of predictability and often 
forecast significantly negative excess bond returns at 3- and 4-year horizons over and above 
traditional proxies for risk premium. These results are difficult to explain using rationally 
time-varying risk aversion or other drivers of countercyclical risk premium. Instead the 
findings suggest that intermediary frictions, investor over-extrapolation and reaching for 
yield drive variations in required high yield bond returns.  
KEYWORDS 
Issuer characteristic spread, issuer quality, high yield excess bond returns, European 
corporate bond markets 
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ISSUER QUALITY AND THE CREDIT CYCLE, EUROPEAN EVIDENCE 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tämän pro-gradu tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää yritysten velanoton  ja velan 
hinnoittelun välistä suhdetta Euroopan talousalueen yhtiöiden keskuudessa. Työssä tutkitaan, 
kasvaako keskimääräisen velallisen riskisyys taloussuhdanteiden  noustessa, 
alihinnoittelevatko sijoittajat lainaamansa velkarahan kyseisinä ajanjaksoina, ja johtaako 
mahdollinen alihinnoittelu toistuvasti negatiivisiin ylituottoihin. Lisäksi tutkimuksen 
päämääränä on löytää syitä mahdolliselle velan alihinnoittelulle. 
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Lähdeaineisto koostuu eurooppalaisten julkisesti noteerattujen markkina-arvoltaan yli 100 
miljoonan euron yritysten tilinpäätöstiedoista. Kaikki havainnoidut yritykset toimivat muilla 
kuin rahoitusalalla tai julkispalveluissa.  Lisäksi tutkimuksessa käytetään Saksan valtion 
joukkovelkakirjalainojen ja korkeariskisten yritysten joukkovelkakirjalainaindeksien 
(kansankielessä roskalainat) aikasarjoja. Eurooppalaisten roskalainamarkkinoiden myöhäisen 
kehittymisen vuoksi tutkimuksen aikasarja ulottuu vuodesta 1998 vuoden 2011 syyskuulle. 
Empiirinen tutkimus suoritetaan ensisijaisesti vertailemalla suhteellisesti paljon ja vähän 
nettovelkaa kasvattavien yritysten konkurssiriskien eroja. Toinen laatumittari on 
roskalainojen osuus kaikista liikkeelle lasketuista pörssilistattujen yritysten 
joukkovelkakirjalainoista.  
TULOKSET 
Tulokset osoittavat, että niiden ajanjaksojen jälkeen, jolloin velan liikkeellelaskijoiden 
suhteellinen riskisyys on kasvanut, riskisempien yritysten joukkovelkakirjojojen haltijat 
saavat sijoituksilleen toistuvasti negatiivista ylituottoa.  Ylituotto määritellään tässä 
yhteydessä Saksan valtionlainojen tuoton ylittäväksi osaksi. Löydetty korrelaatio velallisen 
riskisyyden ja joukkovelkojen keskipitkän aikavälin (3-4 vuotta) tuottojen välillä on 
merkittävä ja vaikeasti selitettävissä ainoastaan perinteisiä tuottoa ennustavia mittareita 
käyttämällä. Sen sijaan tulokset viittaavat siihen, että sijoittajien liiallisella itsevarmuudella, 
tuoton tavoittelulla ja rahoituksen välittäjien (mm. pankit, vakuutusyhtiöt) roolilla on 
merkittävä osuus löydettyjen ilmiöiden selittämisessä. 
AVAINSANAT 
Velan liikkeellelaskijoiden laatu, velan liikkeellelaskijoiden riskisyys, roskalainojen 
ylituotot, Eurooppalaiset joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation for the Thesis 
During the first half of financial year 2011 European companies issued EUR 38 billion of high-
yield bonds, an amount which was already approaching 2010’s record issuance of EUR 51 billion 
(The Economist, 2011). Escalated financial crises in Greece challenged the growth temporarily. 
On the other hand tentative signs of recovery were already in sight in the last quarter of the year 
2011. The supply of high-yield bonds has been up because many European companies cannot get 
loans from deleveraging banks. At the same time demand has been strong because low interest 
rates and relatively high inflation in Europe drives investors to seek returns.  
Despite of the on-going boom, high-yield corporate bonds are still relatively new instruments to 
European investors. Initially the idea of European high-yield bond markets was brought up in the 
early 1990s when the long prepared Single European Act enabled free movements of labour and 
capital in the beginning of 1993. However, high-yield bond market did not begin to grow 
substantially in the continental Europe before the introduction of the euro currency (Bondt and 
Marqués, 2004). After that high-yield market has seen two credit booms. Prior to 2001 telecom 
companies were popular issuers and from 2003 to 2007 bonds were primarily issued to fund 
leveraged buy-outs. During these periods investors granted credit at low promised yields to 
borrowers of low quality and experienced low returns when these borrowers later defaulted and 
credit spreads widened. Between these booms the new issuance market for high yield bonds has 
been almost dead silent and this silence descended also in 2008 after the latest financial crises 
started.  
It is easy to see that the amount of new issuances has varied a lot during the last decade. 
Fluctuations in the quantity of credit has traditionally been seen to be driven by time-varying 
financing frictions due to changes in borrowers’ net worth or in bank capital (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Kashyap Stein and 
Wilcox, 1993). Greenwood and Hanson (2011) challenged this traditional view by pointing out 
that traditional accounts ignore the possibility that time-varying investor beliefs or tastes play a 
role in determining the quantity and allocation of credit. Greenwood and Hanson saw that 
overheated credit markets reflect heightened investor risk appetites or over-optimism.  This thesis 
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absorbs the mindset of Greenwood and Hanson (2011) being the first academic paper studying 
the relationship between issuer quality and corporate bond returns in European context. The aim 
is to show that issuer quality has incremental forecasting power for corporate bond returns over 
and above traditional proxies for risk premium. Further, this thesis argues that investors are 
systematically incorrect in assessing credit quality at different stages of the credit cycle. 
1.2 Research Gap 
The scope of this study covers European publicly listed companies and high yield corporate bond 
markets. Euro area bond market has received fairly little academic attention even though its size 
is comparable to U.S. debt markets. For example, international corporate bonds denominated in 
euros and in US dollars outstanding in September 2011 were USD 12,232 and USD 8,770 billion, 
respectively (Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly review, December 2011). Previous 
empirical studies on European bond market have mainly analysed the integration and diffusion 
processes started after the inception of the common currency union. Especially the yield spreads 
between Euro-countries have been studied (For example Codogno, Favero and Missale 2003).  
More specifically, this study focuses on linking the patterns of corporate debt financing to time-
series variation in the pricing of credit. There are a few papers in corporate finance and 
macroeconomics which explains why the quantity of credit fluctuates over the credit cycle. 
Probably the most significant being the study conducted by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 
Bernanke and Gertler introduced a model of the business cycle in which the higher borrowers’ 
net worth reduces the agency costs of financing. In the model the strengthened borrower balance 
sheet expands investment demand which in turn tends to amplify the upturn. There are also 
papers that concentrate to explain the role of financial intermediaries in economic cycles. For 
example Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) studied the role of financial intermediates and found that 
all sorts of capital tightening hit hardest the poorly capitalized firms. The model of Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) showed that the dynamics of the cycle is nonlinear: the weaker the initial position 
of borrower, the more powerful the exponential effect to the cash flow is when the external shock 
hits the company. This finding emphasises the importance of issuer quality as an explaining 
factor in future bond returns. In 1996 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist introduced a theory of 
financial accelerator which was largely based on the paper of Bernanke and Gertler published 
seven years earlier. This theory proposed that borrowers facing relatively high agency costs in 
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credit markets will bear the brunt of economic downturns. The reduced spending, production and 
investments by high agency costs borrowers will then increase the effects of recessionary shocks.  
At the same time when the fluctuations in the quantity of credit are seen to be driven mainly by 
time-varying financing frictions, the possibility of time-varying investor beliefs and tastes in 
determining the quantity and allocation is almost fully ignored.  Probably the most distinguished 
study taking this possibility into account is conducted by Greenwood and Hanson (2011). 
Greenwood and Hanson showed that the quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during 
credit booms and this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders.  
Greenwood and Hanson also identified three possible interdependent explanations for the time-
series variation in expected bond excess returns: countercyclical variation in the rationally 
determined price of risk, time-variation in intermediary risk tolerance and time-varying 
mispricing of assets. In Greenwood and Hanson’s study excess corporate bond returns were 
defined as returns over Treasury Bonds of similar maturities.  Greenwood and Hanson also 
studied the dependence of the high yield bond markets and the intermediary balance sheet 
strength but these findings were contradictory.  
This master’s thesis fills an important gap in the existing literature by studying the possibility that 
time-varying investor beliefs or tastes play a role in determining the quantity and allocation of 
credit in Europe. Thesis expands the idea presented by Greenwood and Hanson (2011) by first 
closely following the methodology used in the original study, comparing the obtained results and 
after that by developing the methodology applied by Greenwood and Hanson so that it better 
serves as a forecasting tool.  
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions  
The first objective of this thesis is to build a solid basis for understanding the reduced-form 
model introduced by Greenwood and Hanson (2011) in which corporate debt issuance responds 
to changes in the pricing of credit. The model explains why debt issuer quality may be useful for 
forecasting excess credit returns. The second objective is to empirically examine whether issuer 
quality is a better barometer of the credit market than the quantity of new issuances by using two 
different indicators for issuer quality.  The research questions derived from these objectives can 
be stated as follows:  
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1. How does the aggregate debt growth correlate with the future excess bond 
returns? 
The first question relates to the studies of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1996) and Greenwood and Hanson (2011). Bernanke and Gertler introduced a theory 
where higher borrowers’ net worth reduces the agency costs of financing. Bernanke Gertler and 
Gilchrist expanded this idea by introducing a financial accelerator to the original model which 
showed that borrowers facing relatively high agency costs in credit markets will bear the brunt of 
economic downturns. Greenwood and Hanson showed that aggregate credit growth forecast 
excess bond returns and the credit growth of low quality firms has higher predicting power than 
credit growth of high quality companies. Excess bond returns are defined as returns over German 
Government Bonds of similar maturities. The aim of this thesis is to show that the debt growth 
itself also is a defining feature of the credit cycle and especially debt growth of lower level 
companies has significant forecasting power. 
2. How the bond issuer quality fluctuations are correlated with the future 
excess bond returns? 
The second question focuses on issuer quality and the credit cycle. The variation in issuer quality 
is a central feature of the credit cycle, proved by Atkinson (1967) Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and 
Greenwood and Hanson (2011). This study applies Greenwood and Hanson’s approach to identify 
issuer quality fluctuations and tries to show that the same patterns in issuer quality and bond 
returns are significant also in the European bond markets. First this is done with the firm-specific 
data starting from the year 1980. This sample contains all non-financial European companies that 
have been stock listed between 1980 and 2011. The aim is to show that the quality fluctuations are 
not currency dependent and the pattern has existed already for a longer period. The actual research 
is done by studying the excess returns of euro and British pound denominated high-yield bonds. 
This reduces the time period to 13.5 years because of the lack of prevailing high yield bond index 
before year 1998.  
3. Does quality have an incremental forecasting power for corporate bond 
returns over and above traditional proxies for risk premium? 
The third research question relates to the incremental forecasting power of bond returns when the 
forecasting power of term spread, short-term government bond yields, past excess bond returns 
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and credit spreads are controlled. Greenwood and Hanson (2011) showed that issuer quality is a 
significant predictor of future bond returns and remains significant even after adding risk and 
return variables into the calculations. In order to answer the third question the methodology used 
by Greenwood and Hanson is developed a bit further. For example quarterly data frequency is 
used and some variables are lagged to ensure the accuracy and the truthfulness of the results. 
4. Is there a relationship between financial intermediary balance sheet 
strength and excess bond returns? 
The fourth question focuses on the paper of Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010). Adrian and Shin 
argued that when market conditions get worse, the intermediary demand for high-yield assets 
decline. According to Adrian Moench and Shin, high yield securities are more heavily exposed to 
market-wide changes in the pricing of credit risk, and in order to manage the riskiness of the 
volatility, intermediaries dump their risky assets to the secondary market when market conditions 
weakens. This argument is tested with the behaviour of European insurance companies, broker-
dealers and banks. 
5. What are the forces driving time-series variation in expected corporate 
bond returns and the relative quantity of high-yield bond issuances? 
The last part of the study relates strongly to the behaviouristic finance related studies conducted by 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) as well as Rajan (2005). Campbell and Cochrane argued that 
investors are not systematically surprised when the bonds of low quality firms who often receive 
funding during booms later underperform. Rajan offered a slightly different explanation by 
suggesting that agency problems may encourage investors to reach for yield. Consistent with these 
ideas the aim is to show that issuer quality declines when yields on German Government Bonds 
are low or have recently fallen. 
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1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis  
This thesis and its results are limited by geography, time and company type. The research is 
limited to non-financial publicly listed companies which are headquartered in Europe1 and have a 
market value equal or greater than 100 million Euros. The observed time period is 1998-2011. 
Only companies whose financial year ends at the yearend are counted. The study also uses high-
yield bond return data to track the success of the high-risk bonds to German Government Bonds. 
The data source used is Bank of America Merrill Lynch European Currency High Yield Index. It 
tracks the performance of EUR and GBP denominated below investment grade corporate debt 
publicly issued in the Eurobond, sterling domestic or euro domestic markets.  
This study also is limited by the quality of the dataset which is used. Lack of quarterly financial 
data available in Thomson ONE Banker database between the years 1998-2000 is the most severe 
one. The total length of studied time period is 13.5 years. Short time period requires as frequent 
financial dataset as possible and in this case the quarterly observations are used. However, 
Thomson ONE Banker does not offer balance sheet data on quarterly bases exclusively until the 
end of the year 2000. The lack of quarterly financial data affects to the first quality indicator used 
in this thesis. This indicator measures the characteristic spread between high and low net debt 
issuers’ expected default probabilities. However, this deficiency can be controlled by testing the 
results with second quality measure; credit ratings assigned to new corporate bond issues. The 
obtained results are similar in magnitude and thus the missing data for first two years does not 
substantially change the basic results. 
1.5 The most Relevant Findings  
The most relevant and reliable finding of this thesis is that the quality of non-financial corporate 
debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms and this deterioration has a significant and negative 
relationship with high yield bond returns. While showing that corporate bonds significantly 
underperform riskless German Government Bonds after the periods when the issuer quality has 
been poor, the thesis also notes that the lagged annually observed values of issuer quality 
                                                 
 
1
 Classification of Countries by major area and region of the World, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of  
United Nations 
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fluctuations lose their forecasting power. To issue this problem the methodology is modified so 
that quarterly financial and market data can be used. This methodological change increases the 
accuracy of the model as a forecasting tool. 
Further, empirical part of this thesis proves that issuer quality has an incremental forecasting 
power over and above term and credit spread, lagged bond returns and short-term German 
Government Bond yields at 3- and 4-year horizons. At the shorter horizons above mentioned 
control variables win the horse race against the issuer quality. Furthermore, obtained results 
suggest that the quality of debt issuance is a better forecasting tool for excess corporate bond 
returns than the aggregate quantity of debt issuance. This finding proposes that the quantity of 
debt issuance responds to common chocks which are unrelated to the pricing of credit risk.  
However, the statistical significance of issuer quality is attenuated when results are controlled for 
financial intermediary balance sheet strength. Obtained results are in line with the existing 
literature which argues that fluctuations in intermediary equity capital or balance sheet health 
impact risk premiums (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; He and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Garleanu and 
Pedersen, 2010; Duffie, 2010). Empirical part of this thesis also suggests that investors are taking 
excess investment risks when riskless rates are low or have recently fallen. Further, building on 
representativeness heuristics of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the possibility that investors are 
prone to over-extrapolation is suggested. . 
1.6 Key terms and Definitions 
Credit Rating agency is a company that assigns credit ratings for issuers of certain 
types of debt obligations and instruments, for example bonds. In this study credit 
ratings for individual bonds are obtained primarily from Moody’s and if not 
available, from Standard & Poor’s (S&P). 
Credit spread is the yield difference of risk bearing and risk free debt securities that 
have the same maturity.  
Excess returns are log returns over German Government Bond returns. Excess 
returns can be also negative. 
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Fallen angel is a corporate or municipal bond that was investment-grade when 
issued but have been downgraded after the issuance. Bonds are downgraded by a 
rating agency, such as Moody’s Investors Service or Standard & Poor’s (S&P). 
High-yield bond is a bond that is having a higher risk than investment-grade 
corporate bonds, treasury bonds and municipality bonds. Because of the higher risk 
of default, these bonds pay a higher yield than investment grade bonds. High yield 
bonds are those rated Ba1 or lower by Moody’s or BB+ or lower by Standard & 
Poor’s. 
Investment-grade bond is a bond which has a relatively low risk of default. 
Investment-grade bonds have a credit rating of Baa3/ BBB- (Moody’s and S&P, 
respectively) or higher. 
Issuer quality refers to the issuer default probability. In this thesis issuer quality is 
defined with two different ways. The first one is the average expected default 
probability between high and low net debt issuers. The second one is the ratings 
assigned to the new corporate bond issues. 
Maturity date is a final payment date of the bond, at which point the principal and 
all remaining interest is due to be paid.   
Principal amount is the amount borrowed or the part of the amount borrowed 
which remains unpaid after instalment of a loan.  
Term spread is the yield difference of long and short-term debt securities that are 
otherwise identical. 
Term structure of interest rates, also known as the yield curve, is a bond valuation 
method. The yield curve is a measure of the market's expectations of future interest 
rates given the current market conditions.  
Yield to maturity is the internal rate of return (IRR) at the current market price 
assuming that the bond will be held until maturity and all required payments 
considering the bond will be made on schedule. 
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1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two is a literature review that begins by 
introducing corporate default forecasting methodologies and continues by reviewing issuer 
quantity and quality related findings in corporate bond market. The third chapter presents the 
hypothesis of the study and the theoretical reasoning behind them. The fourth chapter states the 
research approach and describes the different quality measures used in this thesis. The fifth 
chapter describes the data and continues by showing the average, minimum, maximum and the 
standard deviation of the variables. The actual results of the study are presented in the sixth 
chapter. The chapter begins by proving the most intuitive hypothesis and continues to the more 
advanced ones by introducing multivariate regressions and the results derived from them. The 
chapter ends at the robustness checks. The seventh chapter sheds light on the forces driving time-
series variation in expected corporate bond excess return. The final chapter draws conclusions 
and suggests paths for the future research.  
 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the academic literature of the credit risks, credit quality, credit quantity and 
debt issuer quality. First part of the chapter introduces the theoretical framework of credit risk 
modelling and the systematic abnormal returns pointed out by the previous empirical studies. 
Secondly this chapter sheds light on the credit quantity fluctuations which are seen to be driven 
by time-varying frictions, mainly due to borrowers’ net worth or in bank capital (Greenwood and 
Hanson, 2011).  The third objective of this chapter is to go through the previous studies 
concerning issuer quality fluctuations which are shown to be a central feature of credit cycle. 
Finally, intermediaries’ role in financial shocks and how the intermediary balance sheet strength 
can forecast excess returns for risk bearing assets are discussed. 
2.1 Corporate Default Forecasting and Credit Pricing 
The value of corporate debt and capital structure are interlinked variables (Leland, 1994). Debt 
values and yield spreads cannot be determined without understanding the capital structure of the 
firm. Capital structure in turn affects the default probability. According to Merton (1974) the 
value of a particular issue of corporate debt depends essentially on three items: (1) the required 
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rate of return on riskless debt, (2) the various provisions and restrictions contained in the 
indenture (primarily maturity date, coupon rate, call terms, seniority in the event of default and 
sinking funds) and (3), the probability that the firm is unable to satisfy some or all of the 
indenture requirements. While the first two items are equally important with the last one, this 
study concentrates to the relationship between the issuer quality, i.e. firm’s default probability 
and associated bond returns. The next three sections show the corporate default forecasting 
framework in depth.  
2.1.1. Univariate and Multivariate Credit-scoring Systems 
Altman and Saunders (1997) argued that even in the late 1970s and the early 1980s most of the 
financial institutions relied virtually exclusively on subjective analysis to assess the credit risk of 
corporate loans. Essentially the various borrower characteristics like reputation, leverage, cash 
flow volatility and collaterals were used in judgements. Taffler (1995) showed that bankers who 
used subjective valuation methods tend to be overly pessimistic about credit risk of less 
developed countries. Based on Taffler’s study, it is rational that over the past 30 years financial 
institutions and bankers have increasingly moved away from subjective systems towards more 
objectively based models like multivariate credit scoring systems. At the same time a number of 
systems have been developed to predict corporate defaults. Bellovary, Giacomino and Akers 
(2007) counted that between years 1965 and 2007 altogether 165 analyses of bankruptcy 
prediction studies were published. The richness of the methods and different modifications is so 
large that it is not rational to analyse all of them. This chapter introduces the most important 
methods to give an insight why the Merton’s Distance-to-Default model (1974) is chosen as a 
primary bankruptcy predictor in this study.  
Altman and Saunders (1997) classified four methodological approaches to develop multivariate 
credit scoring systems: (1) the linear probability model, (2) the discriminant analysis model, (3) 
the probit model and (4), the logit model. The linear probability model assumes that the 
probability of default varies linearly with the estimation factors. On the contrary discriminate 
analysis divides borrowers into high and low default risk classes and compares these classes to 
each other. The first pioneer of discriminant analysis was Beaver (1968). He developed a 
univariate discriminant analysis model using a number of financial ratios. Beaver’s analysis was 
based on studying one financial ratio at the time and on developing a cut-off threshold for each 
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ratio. A year later Altman (1968) introduced a statistical multivariate analysis technique and 
estimated a Z-score model. Altman’s Z-score model became a cornerstone of the failure 
prediction studies. It also has remained as an accepted standard method and is used as a baseline 
method for comparative studies. The problem with discriminant models is their poor out-of-
sample forecasting accuracy.  
Models based on cumulative distribution function began to appear in the late 1970s. Probit model 
is a type of cumulative distribution function where the dependent variable can only take two 
values in this case defaulting or non-defaulting.  Logit model on the other hand provides a 
probability for a firm to go bankrupt. The goal of logistic regression is to find the best fitting 
model to describe the relationship between the dichotomous characteristic of dependent variable 
and a set of independent variables. (Dimitras and Zanakis, 1996). Logit analysis was first 
proposed for bank failure prediction by Martin (1970) and for the prediction of business failure 
by Ohlson (1980). 
2.1.2. Structural and Reduced-form Models 
While in many cases multivariate credit-scoring systems have been shown to perform quite well 
over different time periods and countries, they have been subject to at least three sources of 
criticism (Altman and Saunders, 1997). First, multivariate models are predominately based on 
book value accounting data and hence the metrics are not likely to pick up the most subtle and 
fast-moving changes in borrower condition. Secondly the world is not linear and therefore the 
linear probability model and linear discriminate analysis may fail to forecast the future outcomes 
accurately compared to the models that relax the underlying linearity assumption. Thirdly Altman 
and Saunders argued that traditional credit-scoring bankruptcy prediction models are often only 
slightly linked to underlying theoretical models.  As such, there have been a number of new 
approaches which generally falls into two main classes: structural models and reduced-form 
models (Leake, 2003). 
Structural models 
Structural models follow the framework set out by Merton (1974) in using the principles of 
option pricing to price default-risky debt. Default is seen as a call option held by equity holders, 
which is exercised when the value of firm falls below the value of debt.  Merton (1974) priced 
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this option by using the techniques developed by Black and Scholes (1973). In Black and Scholes 
model the price of a company’s debt is a function of the firm’s value, the default-free interest 
rate, the maturity of the debt, the expected volatility of firm’s value and the company’s net debt 
scaled with equity.   
Merton’s (1974) model, on which this thesis is fundamentally based, argues that firm’s capital 
structure comprises from equity and a single zero-coupon bond. Default occurs when the firm’s 
value at the maturity of the bond is below the principal value of debt. In Merton’s model a 
company can default only on the maturity dates of its zero-coupon bond because before that date 
the company is not making repayments to its bondholders. In the event of default the repayment 
to bondholders is the market value of the firm. Merton’s model assumes a flat term structure. 
This eliminates the possibility to examine the relationship between credit spreads and changes in 
the slope of the yield curve (Leake, 2003). Because default can occur only on the maturity date of 
the zero-coupon bond, default risk depends on the value of firm relative to the value of the debt. 
Assuming that the increase in interest rates do not affect to the value of firm, a higher interest rate 
results in a higher drift rate for the firm value process and hence lower the risk-neutral 
probabilities of default at maturity. All this leads to the situation where higher default-free 
interest rates are associated with lower credit spreads (Leake, 2003).  
More recent structural models allow default to occur prior to the data on which the debt matures. 
For example in Longstaff’s and Schwartz’ (1995) model, the default is determined by the time 
when the value of the firm falls below the value of the debt. Following Merton’s model, 
Longstaff and Schwartz assumed that the value of the firm follows a diffusion process with 
constant volatility but on the contrary to Merton’s model, default-free interest rates are allowed to 
move randomly over time. However, this expansion to Merton does not alter the result that an 
increase in interest rates leads to a fall in default risks and hence lowers the credit spread.  
Reduced-form models 
Reduced-form models do not try to explain why default takes place but allows a hazard process 
to be specified. Since these models do not specify a firm value process, the payoff in the event of 
default is determined exogenously (Leake, 2003). Jonkhart (1979) created a simple model that 
linked the probability of default directly to the credit spreads without specifying a hazard rate 
process. Fons (1994) on his turn developed a simple bond pricing model to calculate the credit 
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spread required by a risk-neutral investor on a default-risky bond issued at par2, using historical 
default rates. Fons found that calculated credit spreads are always lower than credit spreads 
observed in the market, particularly for investment-grade bonds. Fons explained several reasons 
for this difference: lower liquidity in corporate bonds leads to a liquidity premium; tax effects 
favouring Treasuries over corporate bonds; risk-aversion of investors and the risk of downgrade 
of bonds.  
More recent reduced-form models assumes stochastic interest rates, augmented with a hazard rate 
process (Altman and Saunders, 1997). Some researchers e.g., Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) used 
the underlying interest rate model of Heath and Morton (1992) and specified a constant hazard 
rate. 3  Similarly, Duffie and Singleton (1999) treated default as an unpredictable event governed 
by a hazard-rate process. However, the approach of Duffie and Singleton was distinguished by 
the parameterization of losses at default in terms of the fractional reduction in market value that 
occurs at default.   
Hazard models are state of the art reduced-form default models. In order to use a broad range of 
information and to allow for time varying covariates, Shumway (2001) suggested a hazard model 
for the estimation of default probabilities that uses both accounting and market information. 
Shumway found that many accounting based ratios included in previous statistic models became 
insignificant when employed in hazard models. In contrast Shumway proved that market 
variables such a firm’s market size, past stock returns and the idiosyncratic equity volatility are 
strongly related to default.   
2.1.3. Merton’s Distance-to-Default Model according to Bharath and Shumway 
One application of the structural model is the Merton’s distance-to-default (DD) model which 
applies the framework of Merton (1974). In this model the equity of the firm is a call option on 
the underlying value of the firm with a strike price equal to the face value of firm’s debt. The 
model recognizes that neither the underlying value of the firm nor its volatility is directly 
                                                 
 
2
 A bond selling at par has a coupon rate such that the bond is worth an amount equivalent to its original issue value 
or its value upon redemption at maturity. 
3
 Other examples of reduced-form models include for example those of Madan and Unal (1994), Lando (1998), 
Artzner and Delbaen (1995), Das and Tufano (1995), Jarrow Lando and Turnbull (1997), Martin (1997), Hull and 
White (2000), Duffie Lando (2001) 
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observable. However, under the model assumptions both value of the firm and its volatility can 
be inferred from the value of equity, the volatility of equity and several other observable 
variables by using iterative procedure to solve a system of nonlinear equations. Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) noted that at least two assumptions in Merton’s DD model are generally 
violated:  first the value of each firm does not follow geometric Brownian motion in real life and 
secondly, each firm usually issue more than just one zero-coupon bond. Bharath and Shumway 
argued that it should be possible to construct a reduced-form model that can avoid the shortages 
of the original DD model.  
Bharath and Shumway (2008) created a naïve alternative for Merton’s DD model, which used the 
functional form suggested by the Merton’s model but did not solve the model for an implied 
probability of default. This simplified calculations when the iterative procedure was omitted.  
Results of the research of Bharath and Shumway suggested that the value of the original 
Merton’s DD model lied in its functional form rather than its solution of the Merton’s option 
pricing model. In empirical tests Bharath and Shumway found that their naïve predictor 
performed slightly better in hazard models and in out-of-sample forecasts than both, Merton’s 
DD model and the reduced-form model using the same inputs. However, the difference in results 
between the hazard model and the simple reduced-form model using the same inputs did not 
significantly differ from zero.   
2.2 Empirical Findings on Bond Returns 
Despite of the extensive studies in the field of bond pricing, the theories still cannot exclusively 
explain the market valuation of bonds. This chapter glances through the existing literature 
concerning excess bond returns and drivers affecting these results, excluding issuer quality and 
quantity. The fluctuations in issuer quality and the credit quantity are discussed in chapters 2.3 
and 2.4. 
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) noted that even though the concept of duration is theoretically 
correct to characterize the price sensitivity of a bond to a parallel shift in the yield curve, in 
reality yields do not always move in a parallel fashion. Litterman and Scheinkman studied the 
returns of U.S. government bond returns empirically to determine the common factors that have 
affected returns on Treasury-based securities in the past. The analysis suggested that the most of 
the variation in returns on all fixed-income securities can be explained in terms of three attributes 
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of the yield curve. Litterman and Scheinkman called these attributes level, steepness and 
curvature. More concrete study was conducted by Cambell and Ammer (1991) who studied the 
movements of stock and bond returns in relation to the expectations of future stock dividends, 
inflation and short-term real interest rates. By studying post-war U.S. data, Cambell and Ammer 
found out that excess 10-year bond returns are driven largely by news about future inflation. Real 
interest rates on the other hand were seen to have little impact on bond returns, although they did 
affect the short-term nominal interest rates and the slope of the term structure. 
Also the maturity of new issues has been proved to predict excess bond returns (Baker, 
Greenwood and Wurgler, 2003); when the share of long-term debt issues of the total debt issues 
is high, future excess bond returns are low. Baker Greenwood and Wurgler found out that this 
predictive power comes in two parts. First inflation, the short-term interest rates and the term 
spread together predict excess bond returns. Secondly, these same variables explain the long-term 
share, and together predict excess bond returns. The results Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler 
found out are consistent with empirical evidence that firms use debt market conditions an effort 
to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980; 
Fung and Rudd, 1986).  
Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) showed that bond supply predicts excess bond returns. They 
examined empirically how the maturity structure of government debt affects bond yields and 
excess returns. They organized their empirical study around preferred habitat, in which shocks 
impact an arbitrage-free term structure. Consistent with the model, they found that the relative 
supply of long-term government bonds is positively related to bond yield spreads and excess 
returns. In addition the effect is stronger for longer-maturity bonds. The forecasting power of 
supply also remained after controlling results for term-structure slope. Olli Pohja (2010) found 
similar results when researching German Government Bond data in his Master’s thesis work. 
Vayanos (2010) studied liquidity and liquidity premiums as explaining factors for abnormal 
returns. He showed that during volatile times, investors’ effective risk aversion increases and the 
negative correlation between volatility and price movements get stronger. Thus there is a flight to 
quality in a sense that the risk premium investors require per unit of volatility, increases. Vayanos 
also showed that an unconditional capital asset pricing models can understate the risk of illiquid 
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assets because of the risk’s time-varying nature. The reason for this is that illiquid assets become 
even riskier in volatile times in tandem with increased investors’ risk aversion.  
2.3 Fluctuations in the Quantity of Credit 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) developed a neoclassical model of business cycle which showed 
that higher borrower net worth reduces the agency costs of financing real capital investments. 
Business upturns increase net worth, lower agency costs and increase investment. The main 
implication of the study was that the upturn forms an accelerator effect in economy; strengthened 
borrower balance sheets resulting from good times expand investment demand which in turn 
tends to amplify the upturn. A possible example of the phenomenon is debt-deflation, first 
analysed by Irwin Fisher (1933). The debt-deflation decreases asset values, increases agency 
costs between borrowers and lenders and restricts the access to external finance to all market 
participants. The resulting fall in investments has negative effects on both aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand. The model of Bernanke and Gertler counted only two periods where 
entrepreneurs and lenders act; one where investors increased their wealth and one where they 
enjoyed their property. This theoretical assumption created a gap between the model and the 
reality. Gertler (1988) closed this gap and argued in his multiple period setting that borrower’s 
net worth should be augmented to include not just current endowment but also the secure part of 
the future endowments.  
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) studied the relationship between monetary policy and 
companies’ financing decisions. They found that tighter monetary policy leads to a shift in firms’ 
mix of external financing: commercial paper issuances rise while bank loans fall. However in 
order to work, this mechanism requires that the tightening of the supply of bank credit is not 
driven by output-induced effects on aggregate credit demand and businesses have some ability to 
substitute between the two sources of finance.  If the decreased lending is driven by the slummed 
demand, the both, bank lending and other non-banking sources of lending should decrease. 
Kashyap Stein and Wilcox showed that capital mix can be a leading indicator concerning 
macroeconomic state. The argument of Stein and Wilcox that the mix may be a good proxy for 
the state of monetary policy, is also helpful in understanding the relationship of spreads between 
commercial paper and Treasury bills (CP-bill spread) as a leading indicator of the credit cycle.  
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Several explanations have been offered to clarify the predicting power of the spread and how they 
are related to the quantity of the credit. The first one suggests that the spread reflects the future 
default risk. Bernanke (1990) pointed out that this is at best only a partial explanation. For 
example it is hard to reconcile large swings in the spread with changes in default expectations, 
given that defaults on prime securities are extremely rare. A second proposal is presented by 
Friedman and Kuttner (1993). Friedman and Kuttner found empirical support for the argument 
that companies demand for funds change around the cyclical turning points, and hence 
commercial papers and treasury bills are imperfect substitutes. Friedman and Kuttner also 
showed that shocks to corporate cash flows appear to be an important determinant of prices and 
quantities in short-term credit markets. The third explanation discussed also by Friedman and 
Kuttner (1993), Bernanke (1990) and by Kashyap Stein and Wilcox (1993) argues that spreads 
contain information about the stance of the monetary policy. Tight monetary policy leads to 
increased commercial paper issuances and if the commercial paper market is less than perfectly 
deep in the sense of market saturation, the result will be an increase in paper rates relative to bill 
rates.  However, Miron, Romer and Weil (1994) found only a little supportive evidence to 
Kashyap Stein and Wilcox’s theory when their study concerning CP-bill spread went further back 
in time.  
The impact of financial intermediation is also addressed. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) studied 
the role of financial intermediation in credit quantity fluctuations. In their model the borrowing 
capacity for both firms and intermediaries was limited. They showed that all types of capital 
tightening hit poorly capitalized firms the hardest. In addition each shock - a credit crunch, a 
collateral squeeze and a saving squeeze - has a distinguishable impact on interest rates, 
monitoring intensity, the solvency of intermediaries and the firms’ leverage.  
2.4 Variation in Issuer Quality and Credit Cycles 
Investment quality was first exclusively researched by W. Braddock Hickman (1958). He 
analysed the prospective bond quality from 1900 to 1943 by reviewing ratings assigned by the 
three biggest agencies (The same Agencies dominates the market also over 50-years after 
Hickman’s paper, Moody’s Fitch and S&P) and compered them to investors’ experiences of 
default rates, yields and loss rates. He noted that the default rates peaked near or right after the 
years of heavy financing. Hickman’s impression was that the quantity as well as the quality of 
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bond financing is related to the long swings in the investment cycle. Hickman argued that 
marginal issues can be floated only in periods of overconfidence because otherwise these risky 
instruments do not find markets. 
After Hickman, Atkinson (1967) studied U.S. corporate bond defaults in the post-war period and 
found that bonds defaulting from 1944 to 1965 were largely offered in years of business peaks or 
one year before the cycle hit the record. On the other hand during the period Atkinson conducted 
his study, the actual defaults were rare, partially because of the economic growth and the absence 
of severe recessions. Atkinson concluded that compared to the pre-war credit markets, both, the 
process whereby bonds are offered and subsequently defaults, continued to be associated with 
business cycles.  
Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) surveyed manufacturing firms and found that small 
companies experience substantially more pro-cyclical variation in sales, inventories and short-
term debt than large firms do. An implication of the finding was that at the onset of recession 
borrowers facing high agency costs should receive a relatively lower share of credit extended. 
Because of this high agency cost, borrowers should account for a proportionally greater part of 
the decline in economic activity. Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist also argued that reduced 
spending, production and investment by high-agency-cost borrowers will exacerbate the effects 
of recessionary chocks.   
US junk bond boom in the late 1980s offered a good example of deteriorating issuer quality and 
investors’ over-optimism. Grant (1992), Klarman (1991), Kaplan and Stein, (1993) have studied 
the 1980s boom and all of them have come into the same conclusion about issuer quality. Kaplan 
and Stein described the junk bond period as follows: “The success of early deals attracted a large 
inflow of new money, and by the late 1980s too much financing was chasing too few good deals”.  
This high-yield bond boom was launched by Michael Milken, the executive of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Inc. He practically created high-yield bond market from the scratch by closing the 
liquidity gap of falling angels and new issues.  Milken’s primary marketing statement was that 
the default risk of the new issue junk bonds was similar to existing small number of fallen angels. 
In reality, the main reason for low default rates for the recent issues in mid-1980s had been the 
economic growth in the early 1980s.  
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Klarman (1991), Asquith, Mullins and Wolff (1989) argued that the denominator in the defaulted 
bond share soared during the 1980s issuance boom, causing the risk under-pricing. U.S. high-
yield market boomed after the mid-80s and therefore the relative size of older high yield bonds 
decreased. Asquith Mullins and Wolff pointed out that an average buy-and-hold investor who 
purchased a portfolio of bonds in 1977-1978, experienced a default rate of 34%. On the other 
hand bonds issued 1979-1983 or 1984-1986 had a default rate of 19-27% and 3-9%, respectively. 
The effect of bond age on the default was clearly evident from the results. Default rates were 
lower immediately after issue but rose over time. By the time the defaults for bonds issued 1979-
1984 occurred, the overall market had grown much larger. The larger total market made the high 
default rates of old bonds appear small relative to the size of the overall market, which now was 
dominated by recently issued bonds with low default rates.  
Probably the most far reaching study concerning the relationship of issuer quality and expected 
returns is done by Greenwood and Hanson (2011). They showed that issuer quality has 
incremental forecasting power for corporate bond returns over and above traditional proxies for 
risk premium, including credit spreads, short-term-interest yield and the term spread. Greenwood 
and Hanson also found out that the quality of debt issuance is a better of excess corporate bond 
returns than the aggregate quantity of the debt issuance. Greenwood and Hanson claimed that 
unlike issuer quality, the quantity of debt issuance responds to common shocks which are 
unrelated to the pricing of credit risk. 
2.5 Intermediaries’ Role in High Yield Bond Returns 
A significant amount of investment is intermediated by brokers, dealers, investments banks and 
insurance companies and other market makers. This intermediation usually takes some time when 
the capital is transferred from one investment opportunity to another. In addition intermediaries 
may also bear investment risks. Thus, when a supply or demand shock takes place, initial price 
adjustments may be larger than they would have been in a market with perfect intermediation 
(Duffie, 2010).   
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) stated that like other corporates, also intermediaries face operational 
constraints. Besides to budget restrictions, the most important ones are financial and regulative 
constraints. The role of funding constraints became apparent also in the global liquidity crisis in 
2007 (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2010). Banks unable to fund their operations closed down and this 
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way the crises spread all over the economy. The key driver in refinancing was the net worth of 
assets which lost their values. Garleanu and Pedersen constructed a model that captured several 
salient features of the last few financial crises. In the model crises generally start from the 
negative chocks which lead to losses for levered agents including the financial sector. Further, 
financial agents will face funding problems as they hit margin constraints. Constraints limit the 
flexibility of financial agents or intermediaries and this inflexibility leads to drop in treasury 
rates, spike to interest-rate spread as well as risk premiums.  According to Garleanu and 
Pedersen, the outcome is increased price gap between securities with identical cash flows but 
different rating.  
Also Kashyap Stein and Wilcox (1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Holmström and Tirole 
(1997) emphasized the importance of fluctuations in banks’ and other intermediaries’ balance 
sheets. Holmström and Tirole showed how capital constraints in intermediation can affect the 
equilibrium interest rates as well as interest rate spreads. Shleifer and Vishny argued that the 
tendency of investors to withdraw funds from intermediaries following negative performance 
limits the ability of intermediaries to exploit high returns. 
Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) studied the possibility that the financial intermediaries are 
affecting to the credit cycles. They found evidence that intermediary balance sheets provide a 
window on the transmission of monetary policy through capital market conditions. Particularly 
intermediary balance sheets that were marked to market, for example balance sheets of broker-
dealers, were appropriate. Adrian Moench and Shin also described the link between the 
intermediary balance sheet and high yield bond returns: Because the majority of the liability side 
of financial institutions comes from short-term borrowing arrangements, their cost of borrowing 
is tightly linked to short-term interest rates. Simultaneously the leverage of the intermediaries is 
constrained by risk. In more volatile markets the leverage becomes riskier and the credit supply 
tends to be more constrained. Finally, by assuming that spreads were a proxy for the long-terms 
asset returns financed with short-term liabilities, Adrian, Moench and Shin showed that 
historically the intermediary demand for high-yield assets have declined when the market 
conditions have gotten worse.  
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3 HYPOTHESES 
This chapter presents the research hypotheses and discusses how they are linked with the 
underlying theories. Overall, in line with Section 2.3 one of the main assumptions is that the 
aggregate credit growth and future corporate bond returns have an inverse relationship. While 
assuming that aggregate credit growth is the fastest during economic booms and demand for 
funds change around the cyclical turning points, this thesis simultaneously hypothesises that all 
types of capital tightening hit poorly capitalized firms the hardest. This assumption is in line with 
Section 2.4 that showed that the quantity as well as the quality of bond financing is related to the 
long swing in the investment cycle. Further, this thesis proposes that issuer quality has 
incremental forecasting power over and above traditional proxies for risk premium. 
As presented in Section 2.5, three different reasons for the inverse relationship between issuer 
quality and excess bond returns will be presented: (1) time-variation in intermediary risk 
tolerance in markets characterized by limited capital or other intermediary financing frictions, (2) 
countercyclical variation in the rationally determined price of risk and (3) time-varying 
mispricing due to investor biases in evaluating credit risk over the cycle.  All these hypotheses 
will be tested to find out the intermediaries’ role in high yield bond performance.  
The rest of this chapter is constructed as follows. Section 3.1 introduces a simple reduced-form 
model in which first three hypotheses are based on. Section 3.2 discusses the role of intermediary 
balance sheet strength to the high yield bond returns and in Section 3.3 Table 1 summarizes the 
hypotheses.  
3.1 Issuer Quantity and Quality 
Following Greenwood and Hanson (2011), this section introduces a simple reduced-form model 
in which corporate debt issuance responds to changes in the pricing of credit. This model 
explains why the debt issuer quality can be a useful proxy for forecasting excess credit returns 
and also explains why quality may contain information about expected returns beyond what is 
revealed by credit spreads. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are derived from this theory.  
The model builds on the credit spread definition of Duffie and Singleton (1999). Duffie and 
Singleton defined credit spread  to be equal to expected credit losses  plus expected excess 
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returns. Expected excess return is a multiplication of expected return on credit assets 	 and 
the exposure 
 of type θ firms to the market-wide pricing of credit risk.  
 	   
	         (1) 
Expected credit losses hθ,t and returns E(Rt) are time-varying variables. The time-varying nature 
of spreads suggests that credit spreads mean different things at different times. Spreads can be 
low because default probabilities are low or because expected excess returns are low. Following 
Greenwood and Hanson (2011) the assumption is that expected credit losses hθ,t do not directly 
affect expected excess returns. In other words from now on credit spread and excess bond returns 
mean the same in this thesis. Thus the expected excess returns,		 on claim type θ is: 
 	 
	         (2) 
Stein (1996) showed that the deviation of optimal capital structure is costly if the company has 
too little or too much debt capital. Following Stein, this reduced-form model assumes that the 
target capital structure is chosen by maximizing the benefits of the cheap debt capital and 
simultaneously minimizing the effect of straying from the optimal debt ratio.  
In this model the target capital structure has two independent components: at is a common capital 
structure component for all firms and cθ,t is a firm specific component for all firms θ. Firms 
choose their capital structure by maximising the following function: 
 	       !"#       $#"%    (3) 
= 
 
	     !"#       $#"%     (4) 
where y reflects the cost of deviating from the target capital structure (as explained in section 
3.2). The optimal choice of leverage  can be derived from the equation (4) and hence is: 
    $   &! # ' 	        (5) 
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Equation (5) suggests that companies borrow more when the expected returns on credit assets 
[E(Rt)] are low (assuming that the exposure to the market-wide pricing of credit risk 
	, and 
the cost of deviating from the target leverage (y), remain unchanged). The Q-theory (Tobin, 
1977) is a classical justification of this argument; the optimal scale of corporate investments and 
hence debt issuance rises when rationally required returns on assets decline.  
For simplicity all companies in this model are either low default risk (L) or high default risk (H) 
entities. The central assumption is that βL <βH meaning that bonds of high default risk firms are 
more heavily exposed to market-wide changes in the pricing of credit risk. The logic behind this 
argument can be seen from the equation (5). Since βL <βH, fluctuations in expected returns 	 
have a larger impact on the issuance of high default risk firms than on the issuance of low default 
risk firms. When assuming that half of the debt is issued by low risk companies and the other half 
by high risk companies the equation (5) can be presented as follows. 
( 	)  *  $(  $)   &+&,! # ' 	.     (6) 
Equation (5) and more detailed version of it, equation (6), offers the common ground for the first 
hypothesis. In line with Tobin’s Q-theory (Tobin, 1969) the assumption is that when the required 
return on credit assets decline, the scale of investments activities and hence debt issuances 
increase. The hypothesis is that during the periods of increased investment activities investors 
underestimate risks and in general require too low returns for their investments. After the turning 
point of the cycle, this underestimation is reflected as a lower or even negative excess bond 
returns. Excess bond returns equal to the credit spread between risk-free Government Bonds and 
corporate bonds of same maturity.  
H1: Aggregate corporate debt growth can forecast excess bond returns. Debt   
growth and excess returns have a negative correlation. 
The challenge with the quantity based approach is that the common capital structure component 
(at) in equation (6) remains for all companies. Thus it is useful to examine the difference in debt 
issuance between high- and low-default risk firms. By looking at the quality of the issuance, the 
impact of the common factor at which affects the debt issuance of all firms, disappears. Thus the 
comparison of the quality mix helps to isolate the information that issuance contains about the 
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expected returns. Following Greenwood and Hanson (2011), the difference in issuer quality is 
measured with the default risk of high net debt issuers with that of low net debt issuers.  
) 	(  $)  $(   &,-&+! # ' 	      (7) 
H2: Debt issuer quality can forecast excess bond returns. Issuer quality and 
excess returns have a negative correlation. 
The reduced-form model described above suggests that the both coefficients of quality and 
quantity will be negative as long as the variance is bigger than zero. However, the quality 
becomes more important explanatory factor when the variance of non-firm specific (at) 
determinants of optimal capital structure grows large or the variance of firm specific determinants 
approach to zero (Greenwood and Hanson, 2011). The same applies also for the credit spread.4 
For example, if aggregate debt issuance fluctuates significantly due to shocks to aggregate 
investment opportunities, the quality mix should be better return indicator. The model also 
suggests that the results are the strongest when forecasting the returns of the low-grade bonds 
which have the greatest exposure to market-wide changes in the pricing of credit.   
H3: Issuer quality has incremental forecasting power over and above the term and credit 
spreads as well as short-term risk-free interest yields. 
3.2 Intermediary Balance Sheet Strength and Time-varying Investors’ Beliefs 
Fourth and fifth hypotheses are related to the financial frictions created by the financial 
intermediaries. These frictional explanations assume that risk premiums fluctuate due to the 
health of financial intermediary balance sheets. Following Gromb and Vayanos (2002), the 
assumption is that financial intermediaries always reduce the wedge between asset prices and 
enable the efficiency of the financial markets. On the other hand intermediaries also are 
financially constrained and their positions cannot exceed the certain level of wealth. So even if 
intermediaries reduce the wedge between assets, they make the wedge more sensitive to supply 
shocks. Intermediary’s wealth serves as collateral and hence a reduction in a wealth can reduce 
                                                 
 
4
 Relevant calculations are presented in Appendix 1. 
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the intermediary’s ability to invest. This inability to invest is closely related to fire sales (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1992). Following Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) this thesis hypothesises that the 
difference in default risk of high net debt issuers with that of low net debt issuers will be high 
when intermediary balance sheets are strong. The difference in default risk of high and low net 
debt issuers is called issuer characteristic spread. 
H4: Intermediary balance sheet strength is a significant determinant of the issuer 
characteristic spread. 
Rajan (2005) argued that certain institutional investors are keen on taking excessive risks and 
reaching the yield when riskless nominal rates are low or have recently fallen. Analogically, the 
low yield curve in 2008-2010 and the subsequent high yield credit boom in 2010 suggest that 
investors may have taken excessive risks. Similarly to Rajan, Klarman (1991) argued that the 
80’s junk bond boom in U.S. was fuelled by investors who still wanted to earn same high 
nominal rates than in the early 1980’s.  Furthermore, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argued 
that investors think that the economy either evolves according to a more or less persistent 
process. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny saw that following low-default realizations investors start 
to believe that the business environment has fundamentally changed and the low default 
environment is more persistent than it truly is. Low credit quality firms are expected to be safer 
than they really are and this wrong risk analysis decreases the price of the credit. Recognizing 
that the credit is cheap, low quality firms will then issue large amount of debt, making then even 
more likely to default in the future. Following Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, the next hypothesis 
is that issuer characteristic spread is wide when term spread, nominal rates and past default rates 
are, or has recently been, at the low level.  
H5: Past default rates and bond returns, term spread and short-term risk free yield are 
significant determinants of the issuer characteristics spread. 
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3.3 Summary of the Hypotheses 
Table 1 presents the research questions presented in Section 1.2 and the hypotheses presented in 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Excess bond returns mentioned in the first hypothesis equal to the credit 
spread between risk-free Government Bonds and corporate bonds of the same maturity.  
 
Table 1 Summary of the hypotheses 
This Table presents the research questions and the hypotheses of this study. The left side of Table 1 presents the 
research questions also presented in Section 1.3. The right side of the table presents the hypotheses of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
1. How does the aggregate debt growth 
correlate with the future excess bond 
returns?
H1 Aggregate corporate debt growth can 
forecast excess bond returns. Debt 
growth and excess returns have a 
negative correlation.
2. How the bond issuer quality fluctuations 
are correlated with the future excess 
bond returns?
H2 Debt issuers quality can forecast 
excess bond returns. The relationship 
between quality and the expected 
returns is negative.
3. Does quality have an incremental 
forecasting power for corporate bond 
returns over and above traditional proxies 
for risk premium?
H3 Issuer quality has incremental 
forecasting power above term and 
credit spread as well as short term risk-
free interest yield.
4. Is there a relationship between the 
intermediary balance sheet strength and 
excess bond returns?
H4 Periods of strong balance sheet of 
financial intermediaries are followed 
by low excess returns on corporate 
bonds.
5. What are the forces driving time-series 
variation in expected corporate bond 
returns and the relative quantity of high-
yield bond issuances?
H5 Past default rates and bond returns, 
term spread and short term risk free 
yield are significant determinants of 
the issuer characteristics spread.
HypothesesResearch questions
27 
 
4 METHODOLOGY 
This section introduces the methodology used in this thesis. The main focus of the thesis is to 
analyse issuer quality and subsequent bond returns. While bond returns are easy and 
straightforward to observe, the issuer quality is more subjective variable.  Following Greenwood 
and Hanson (2011), the issuer quality is measured with two main metrics. The first one compares 
the default risk of high net debt issuers with that of low net debt issuers, denoted as issuer 
characteristics spread ISS. The second quality measure is formed by using credit ratings assigned 
to new corporate bond issues. 
4.1 Issuer Characteristic Spread 
The primary issuer quality method used in this study is a particular application of Merton’s 
(1974) model which was developed by the proprietors of the KMV Corporation5. The original 
model is called Merton’s distance to default (DD) model. Merton’s DD model applies the 
framework in which the equity of the firm is a call option on the underlying value of the firm 
with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. The model recognizes that neither 
the value of the firm nor the volatility of the assets is directly observable. Both can be inferred 
from the value and the volatility of the equity by using an iterative procedure to solve the system 
of nonlinear equations. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) created a naïve alternative for the Merton’s DD model after 
proving that assumptions about the firm’s value following Brownian motion are generally always 
violated. This model captures both the functional form and the same basic inputs of the Merton’s 
DD model without using the Merton’s DD probability as an explanatory variable. The model has 
been shown to forecast default probability with better accuracy than the original Merton’s DD 
model. In this thesis the expected default frequency is calculated following Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). The equation for the expected default probability is: 
./0  1 2 3453
6789797 :;7-<=>?7@ :?7 A       (8) 
                                                 
 
5
 Acquired by Moody’s in 2002. Nowadays Moody’s KMV Corporation. 
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Where Ei,t is the market value of equity and Fi,t the face value of all liabilities computed as short-
term liabilities plus one half of long-term liabilities. µi,t is the asset drift which is estimated by 
using the prior 52-week stock returns, φ[-] is the normal standard cumulative distribution 
function and σV i,t is the asset volatility estimated with the equity volatility σEi,t. 
 BC	0  3D7E7D7 : BE	0+3 D7D7E7: F=FG  F=*G ' BE	0     (9) 
where Ei,t is the market value of equity, Fi,t the face value of all liabilities computed as short-term 
liabilities plus one half of long-term liabilities. On the right side of the equation (9) the debt ratio 
is multiplied with F=FG  F=*G ' BE	0. Five percentage points represent term structure volatility 
and 25% times the equity volatility simulates the volatility associated with default risk (Bharath 
and Shumway, 2008). Highly levered firms with high asset volatility and low returns should have 
the highest EDFs. Other group with high EDF are newly issued small companies which are 
growing at the large speed.  
As shown in Section 3.1, changes in target leverage are not informative about expected returns 
and in addition have a common component that is shared by all firms. Thus it is useful to 
examine the difference in debt issuance between high- and low- default risk firms. To do this 
company sample is divided to 5 different groups (quintiles). All quintiles have the same amount 
of observations and are rebalanced periodically.  When comparing the difference in debt issuance 
the lowest and the highest quintiles are used to minimize the influence of outlier firms and to 
remove the possibility of compositional shifts happened in the economy. The limitation of using 
quintiles is that some company specific information is ignored.   
As shown, the difference in debt issuance is measured with the expected default frequency 
between high and low net debt issuers. The remainder is called as characteristics spread, ISS. In 
this comparison the quality βt and debt issuance can vary continuously across firms.  
HII  
0JKLM	0  
0JNOP	0       (10) 
Previous papers have shown that characteristic spread is wide during credit booms and narrow in 
the bottom of the cycles (Atkinson, 1967; Grant, 1992; Klarman, 1991; Kaplan and Stein, 1993; 
Greenwood and Hanson, 2011). In practise this means that during economic booms the share of 
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lower quality firms of all companies acquiring debt finance is larger. Building on equation (10), 
the credit quality of firms issuing large amount of debt relative to their size to that of firms 
issuing or retiring debt will be compared. The comparison is based on periodical changes in debt, 
Thus in each year t, the expected difference in default frequencies between high and low net debt 
issuers is recalculated. This ratio is denoted by ISSEDF. 
HIIEQD  ∑ EQD77S	,7TU	VW	XWY	7ZZ[W\Z],7TU	VW	XWY	7ZZ[W\Z 
∑ EQD77S	+^_	VW	XWY	7ZZ[W\Z]+^_	VW	XWY	7ZZ[W\Z
 
  (11) 
The annual change in debt is the change in assets minus the change in book equity scaled by the 
lagged assets. This measure counts all changes in liabilities, i.e. also credit payable changes and 
changes in other non-interest bearing debts are recognized. N denotes the number of firms. 
4.2 The High Yield Share 
The second quality measure, the high yield share, is used to control the results of issuer 
characteristic spread. It is formed by using credit ratings assigned to new corporate bond issues. 
Fallen angels are not counted. The primary source for credit ratings is Moody’s. If the Moody’s 
rating is missing, the Standard & Poor’s rating is used. 
K`I  ∑ a7,7TU	b7WcX	∑ a7,7TU	b7WcX	 ∑ a7dVef\gXW	         (12) 
In equation (12) Bt denotes the principal value of bond i issued in year t. The high yield share is 
measured periodically. In empirical part of the thesis the high yield share is changed into a 
logarithmic form because it provides a good fit with the other linear independent variables. There 
is one annual period when the high yield share has been 0%. In this case the value is replaced by 
the logarithmic value of the second smallest high yield share value obtained. 
The advantage of HYS is its simplicity compared to EDF. However, there are several drawbacks 
when using HYS. The first one is that when assuming that loan and bond markets are at least 
partially integrated, the high yield share tracks only the fluctuations in bond markets. European 
debt markets are dominated by bank loans and therefore EDF should be favoured because it 
reflects broader measure of debt issues including both bank loan and bond market financing. 
Secondly the relative sizes of markets have fluctuated significantly because the high yield bond 
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market in Europe is relatively small. There are periods when the high yield issuances count 
almost one third of total issuances and on the other hand periods when the share of high yield 
bonds have been zero. The paper of Greenwood and Hanson (2011) supports the assumptions 
presented above. Despite of these shortages, HYS is included as an explanatory factor in this 
thesis. The reason for this is that HYS may reflect the general credit market confidence and thus 
can deliver some extra value to the research. For example, Greenwood and Hanson (2011) argued 
that high yield bond issuances are not driven by investors’ ability to bear higher risk, but rather 
by their willingness to take risk. If this is the case, HYS should follow the general economic cycle 
with the high accuracy. 
While ISSEDF and log(HYS) are the explaining variables emphasized throughout the thesis, the 
aim is to show that findings of this paper are not sensitive to the specific method used to measure 
the issuer quality. In order to do this excess bond returns are also forecasted with bankruptcy 
hazard rate estimated by Shumway (2008) and with several other issuer characteristic spread 
compilations. The alternative methods and the results are classified in Section 6.6.  
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5 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This chapter introduces the data collection process and outlines the final data sample used in the 
empirical part of this study. Descriptive statistics of the data are included in the end of this 
section.  
5.1 Data Collection Process and the Final Dataset  
The main focus of this thesis is to find the relationship between the issuer quality and excess high 
yield corporate bond returns. In order to do this the high yield bond index data is used. However, 
high yield corporate bond markets did not practically exist in United Kingdom or in continental 
Europe before the inception of euro currency (Bondt and Marqués, 2004). The first high-yield 
index was launched in December, 31st, 1997, by Merrill Lynch (Current Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch). This index is a proxy for high yield bond returns throughout the thesis and thus is the 
single most important time series of the study. BofA Merrill Lynch European Currency High 
Yield Index tracks the performance of euro and British pound denominated below investment 
grade corporate debt publicly issued in the Eurobond, sterling domestic or Euro domestic 
markets. In this context Eurobonds refer to the bonds issued by European corporates denominated 
in non-European currencies. According to BoFa Merrill Lynch, qualifying securities must have a 
below investment grade rating based on an average of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch and an 
investment grade rated country of risk. In addition, qualifying securities must have at least one 
year remaining term to final maturity, a fixed coupon schedule and a minimum amount 
outstanding of EUR 100 million or GBP 50 million. Index constituents are capitalization-
weighted based on their current amount outstanding. This index defines the geographical scope 
and type of companies studied in the thesis.  
This thesis concentrate to analyse the credit behaviour of non-financial companies and therefore 
financial firms are excluded (ICB industry code of 8000 or SIC code 6000-6999) from the 
research sample. In addition governmental entities (SIC code 9000-9999) are not counted in 
because of their regulated nature. Both currently active and non-active corporates are taken into 
account to avoid the survival bias. To be included into the sample company has to have at least 
two consecutive years of balance sheet and market data available. When calculations are 
performed with quarterly financial data, company has to have at least four consecutive quarters of 
data available. Any firm-year without a preceding year/quarter data available is excluded from 
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the final sample. Companies included in the final sample have to be headquartered in one of the 
European countries6. Company specific data is collected by using Thomson ONE Banker.  
After the adjustments mentioned above, the corporate sample consists of 4,201 companies 
headquartered in one of the European countries. Further, companies whose financial year does 
not end on December or whose market value is less than 100 million euros are ruled out. Results 
are also calculated without these controls. When the end of the financial year is not controlled, all 
results looks smoothed. On the other hand the omission of companies which have less than 100 
million euros market cap does not change the obtained results significantly. Figure 1 shows the 
number of annual and quarterly observations in the final sample.  The final sample from 1980 to 
2010 consists of 2,034 companies and altogether 17,691 firm years. The period when the high 
yield bond index data has been available, 1998-2010, the annual company sample consists of 
2,015 companies and 14,143 firm years. 
 
Figure 1 Number of annually and quarterly observed firms 
This Figure shows the number of companies in the final annual and quarterly samples. The final annual sample from 
1980 to 2010 consists of 2,034 companies and altogether 17,691 firm years. Firm years are presented on the left side 
of Figure 1. Quarterly sample consists of 1,336 companies and 25,567 individual quarterly observations from 
January 2001 to September 2011. Quarterly observations are presented on the right side of Table 1.  
 
                                                 
 
6
 Classification of Countries by major area and region of the World, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of  
United Nations 
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Quarterly sample consists of 1,336 companies and 25,567 individual quarterly observations from 
January 2001 to September 2011. Reliable quarterly measured balance sheet data beyond the year 
2001 was not exclusively available and is thus omitted from the analysis. Appendix 2 describes 
the distribution of the observations by countries. 
5.2 Definition of Variables 
This section shortly describes all variables used in this thesis. Summary statistics are shown in 
Table 2. This table describes mean, standard deviation and extreme values of firm characteristics 
and time-series variables. Excess bond returns and different compilations of issuer characteristic 
spread are described in detail while other variables are more common and thus explained more 
briefly. 
Excess bond returns (rxxt+k) is a continuous variable describing the excess returns of corporate 
bond indexes compared to German Government Bond indexes. Excess bond returns are 
calculated for high yield, AAA-grated and BBB-grated7 bond indexes and presented in a 
logarithmic form. Corporate bond indexes used are offered by Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
and on an average have an average time to maturity of five years. Because of the average 
maturity of five years, the 5-year German Government Bond index is used as a risk free bond 
index when calculating excess bond returns. Excess bond returns are calculated for 1-, 2-, 3- and 
4-years cumulatively by summing the log-returns together. 
Debt issuer quality, ISSX compares the highest and the lowest characteristic quintiles of low and 
high debt issuers of the specific year. Companies are divided to quintiles periodically. The main 
quality characteristic is the expected default frequency, EDF. This explanatory variable follows 
the Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default model. Few other characteristics are used to compare 
the results given by EDF. These characteristics include Shumway distress, leverage, size, age, 
CAPM-volatility and dividend policy. ISSX classifies the companies by their annual change of 
total assets minus the change in book equity scaled with the lagged assets. ISSX takes both loan 
and bond market debt growth into the calculations and is hence more reliable measure of debt 
growth than the share of high yield issuances. In the case of ISSEDF, Greenwood and Hanson 
                                                 
 
7
 Standard & Poor’s rating. Moody’s ratings would be Aaa and Baa2, respectively. 
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(2011) showed that ISSEDF is statistically equivalent of credit ratings by having 54% correlation 
with S&P credit ratings during the time period from 1985 to 2008. Firm characteristics related to 
ISSX are measured as of December t or in the end of each quarter depending on the time 
frequency used. Since the measurements are done in the end of the each period, ISSX captures any 
incremental risk that creditors are assuming. This is appropriate because if the transaction(s) 
significantly raises leverage, the company is no longer a low risk player and also credit markets 
should notice this. 
High Yield Share, HYS, is defined as the high yield bond share of all new corporate bond issues 
denominated in euros or in British pounds. In addition bonds have to be issued by companies 
headquartered in Europe between January 1999 and September 2011. The rating is obtained from 
Moody’s. If the Moody’s rating is missing, the Standard & Poor’s rating is used.  
Other variables in the study are: 
Net debt issues (∆d/A)  the change in assets minus the change in book equity plus deferred 
taxes minus preferred stocks scaled by the lagged assets 
Net equity issues (∆e/A)  growth of balance sheet equity and net of retained earnings scaled 
by lagged assets 
External finance (e+d)/A  sum of net debt and the net equity issuance scaled by total assets 
Expected Default frequency  Merton’s (1974) expected default frequency calculated according to 
Bharath and Shumway (2001) 
Shumway distress  bankruptcy hazard rate estimated by Tyler Shumway (2001)  
Leverage (D/A) annual cash flow interest expense scaled by total assets  
Market Cap log(MV)  logarithmic market capitalization of the company in the end of each 
period 
Age     time period the company has been listed in stock exchange.  
Dividend  annual cash dividends scaled by the average market value of equity 
during the period 
yGS,t     2-year German Government Bond yield 
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yGL,t -yGS,t   spread between the 10-year intermediate and 2-year German 
Government Bonds 
yBBB5y,t -yG5y,t   credit spread between BBB-bond index and 5-year German 
Government Bonds. Bank of America Merrill Lynch Emu 
Corporate Non-financial BBB-bond Index used in this study has an 
average maturity of 5 years. 
yAAA5y,t -yG5y,t   credit spread between AAA-bond index and 5-year German 
Government Bonds. Bank of America Merrill Lynch Emu 
Corporate Non-financial AAA-bond Index used in this study has an 
average maturity of 5 years. 
rx
HY
     one year lagged high yield bond excess returns 
 
In addition to above mentioned variables, growth in industrial production, aggregate consumption 
growth, the recession dummy and the output gap are used as macroeconomic control variables. 
Log excess returns on corporate bonds are computed for bond index returns based on high yield 
(HY), BBB-rated and AAA-rated bonds, and are denoted by rx. Excess returns are the difference 
between corporate bond returns and German Government Bond returns of the same maturity.  
To test the predicting power of the intermediary balance sheet strength to excess high yield bond 
returns, the following variables are used: Insurer balance sheet capital (E/AInsurer) and insurer 
balance sheet growth (dA/AInsurer); broker-dealer balance sheet capital (E/ABD) and broker-dealer 
balance sheet growth (dA/ABD); bank balance sheet capital (E/ABank) and bank balance sheet 
growth (dA/ABank); lagged equal weighted returns on bank stocks and bank loan loss provisions 
scaled by the total loans.  
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Table 2 Summary statistics  
Panels A-E of Table 2 show mean, median, standard deviation and extreme values for firm characteristics (Panel A) 
and for time-series variables (Panels B-E). Panel A summarizes the firm-level characteristics. Change in debt is the 
change in assets minus the change in book equity, scaled by lagged assets. Change in equity is the growth of balance 
sheet equity and net of retained earnings, scaled by lagged assets. External finance is the sum of net debt and net 
equity issuance. EDF is the Merton (1974) expected default frequency, calculated following Bharath and Shumway 
(2008). SHUM is the bankruptcy hazard rate as estimated by Shumway (2001). Leverage is book debt over assets. 
Market cap is market value of the equity in millions of euros. Age is the number of years company has been listed in 
stock exchange. Dividends is annual cash dividend scaled by assets. In Panel B, for each characteristic X, ISSX 
compares the average characteristic quintile of high and low debt issuers of that period. Characteristics include 
expected default frequency (EDF), market cap weighted EDF, Shumway distress, EDF deciles, leverage, volatility of 
residuals from CAPM regression, size, age, dividends, EDF level, short-term debt, long term debt and equity. “High” 
and “low” are associated so that the high associated with a higher default probability. HYS for both euro and British 
pound denominated bonds is the high yield share of total bond issues in Europe. “HYS euro denominated bonds” 
accounts only issuances done by European companies in euro currency. Panel C summarizes bond returns and the 
time-series control variables. hij  is the short-term German Government Bond yield. h(j  hij  is the spread 
between the yields on the intermediate- and short-term government and h(aaa  hij  is the credit spread of BBB-
rated bonds. rxY denotes excess returns. Excess returns are returns over risk free bond returns. Characteristics Y 
include 1,2,3 and 4-year excess returns for high yield, BBB- and AAA-rated bonds. Excess equity returns are sample 
stock returns over risk free bond returns. Panel D summarizes time-series measures of intermediary balance sheet 
strength. Characteristics include bank balance sheet capital (total assets minus liabilities all over assets) and bank 
balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); insurer balance sheet capital (total assets minus liabilities 
all over assets) and insurer balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); broker dealer balance sheet 
capital (total assets minus liabilities all over assets) and broker dealer balance sheet growth (percentage change in 
total assets); lagged equal weighted returns on bank stocks and bank loan loss provisions scaled by total loans and 
leases. 
 
Mean Median St.dev Min Max
Change in debt: ∆d/A 0.04 0.01 0.35 -0.99 19.18
Change in equity: ∆e/A 0.03 0.01 0.33 -1.00 15.57
External finance: (e+d)/A 0.04 0.01 0.31 -0.96 19.18
Expected Default Frequency: EDF 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00
Shumway distress: SHUM 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.98
Leverage: D/A 0.48 0.50 0.26 0.00 1.00
Market Cap, EURm 2,879 483 12,528 100 209,056
Age 11.54 9.25 9.76 0.00 47.25
Dividends 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.53
ISSEDF Expected Default Frequency (high-low) 0.13 0.20 0.42 -1.19 0.68
ISSEDF Market Cap weighted 0.00 0.00 0.30 -0.82 0.64
ISSSHUM Shumway distress (high-low) 0.85 0.78 0.34 0.42 1.53
ISSEDF deciles 0.25 0.37 0.94 -2.43 2.00
ISSlev Leverage(high-low) 0.25 0.36 0.37 -0.95 0.82
ISSσ CAPM σ(high-low) 0.85 0.78 0.34 0.42 1.53
ISSMV Size(small-large) 0.07 0.09 0.33 -0.77 0.67
ISSAge Age(young-old) -0.60 -0.55 0.42 -1.86 0.07
ISSDiv Dividends(nonpayer-payer) -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.19 0.14
Panel A: Firm-level data 1998-2011 (quarterly observations)
Panel B: Debt issuer quality 1998-2011 (quarterly observations)
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Panel B continues (quarterly observations) Mean Median St.dev Min Max
ISSlevel 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.10
ISSlt-debt -0.11 0.05 0.51 -1.71 0.62
ISSst-debt 0.04 0.06 0.35 -0.78 0.71
ISSequity 0.10 0.21 0.56 -1.40 1.33
HYS: Euro and British Pound denominated bonds 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.24
HYS: Euro denominated bonds 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.17
Macroeconomic controls:
    yGS,t 2.95 3.15 1.21 0.52 5.07
    yGL,t-yGS,t 1.64 1.76 0.79 0.22 2.86
    yBBB5y,t-yG5y,t 1.51 1.27 0.99 0.37 5.57
Industrial production growth 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.05
Consumption growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.01
Recession dummy 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00
Output gap -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.02
Returns:
    rx
HY
t+1 0.01 0.03 0.21 -0.55 0.57
    rx
BBB
t+1 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.15 0.18
    rx
AAA
t+1 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.04
    rx
HY
t+2 0.01 0.06 0.28 -0.61 0.66
    rx
BBB
t+2 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.17 0.17
    rx
AAA
t+2 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.04
    rx
HY
t+3 -0.03 -0.01 0.25 -0.53 0.40
    rx
BBB
t+3 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.16 0.13
    rx
AAA
t+3 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.01
    rx
HY
t+4 -0.03 0.02 0.25 -0.48 0.47
    rx
BBB
t+4 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.17 0.14
    rx
AAA
t+14 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.00
Excess equity returns -0.22 -0.20 0.29 -0.71 0.26
E/Abank 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.09
dA/Abank 0.03 0.02 0.09 -1.00 2.26
E/AInsurer 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.16
dA/AInsurer 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.26 2.05
E/ABD 0.41 0.41 0.04 0.32 0.48
dA/ABD 0.05 0.02 0.20 -0.94 2.20
Lagged bank equity returns 0.04 0.04 0.12 -0.31 0.28
LoanLossesBank 0.0027 0.0017 0.0023 0.0005 0.0123
Panel C: Returns on macroeconomic controls, %, 1998-2011 (quarterly observations)
Panel D: Intermediary Balance Sheets, (quarterly observations)
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the empirical results of this thesis. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 show how issuer 
characteristic spread and high yield share have developed over time. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 analyse 
the predictive power of issuer quality measures with and without control variables. Section 6.5 
focuses on showing how the quantity and the quality of corporate debt issues correlate together. 
Section 6.6 concludes the chapter by presenting various adjustments to the construction of ISSEDF 
in order to prove the robustness of the obtained results. 
6.1 Characteristic Spread of the Expected Default Probability 
Following the discussion above, this section compares the credit quality of firms issuing large 
amounts of debt to that of firms issuing little debt or retiring debt.8 For each year t, the estimate 
of the firm’s default probability is calculated by following Bharath and Shumway (2008). The 
difference between default probabilities of high and low net debt issuer is denoted by ISSEDF. 9   
Figure 2 describes the characteristic spread, ISS, for issuer quality between the lowest and the 
highest quintiles with black solid line. The figure also shows CEPR10 recession periods with 
darker grey and economic growth pauses with lighter grey. ISSEDFt =1 means that firms with high 
net debt issuance had EDF’s on average one fifth (quintile) higher than firms with low net debt 
issuance. The usage of quintiles minimizes the influence of outlier firms or secular trends. ISSEDF 
is not sensitive to the split up method used and results remain alike even if 5th, 10th or 30th 
percentiles are used.  
The influence of the business cycle can be removed by regressing ISSEDF on the output gap 
(Hodrick Prescott, 1997) and saving the residuals. The orthogonalized series, shown with dashed 
line from the year 1993 onwards, still captures the same peaks and busts of the original series. 
This supports the idea that credit cycle is somewhat different to business cycle and thus the 
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 where EDF is calculated as following the methodology of 
Bharath and Shumway (2008). The methodology is explained thoroughly in Section 4.1. 
 
10
 Centre for Economic Policy Research, a registered charity founded in 1983 
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business cycle predictors do not perfectly fit to external capital analysis. Orthogonalized ISSEDF is 
based on the output gap recorded by OECD.11 
 
Figure 2 Annually measured characteristic spread for issuer quality 
This Figure shows the variation in annually measured characteristic spread for issuer quality, denoted by ISSEDF. 
ISSEDF compares the average default probability of high net debt issuers with the default probability of low net debt 
issuers (top and bottom quintiles, respectively). EDF is the expected default frequency of Merton (1974). The dotted 
line shows a version of ISSEDF that has been orthogonalized with respect to the output gap. Grey areas in the figure 
describe the European recession periods. 
 
ISSEDF has been high in the early and the late 1980s, 1999 - 2001 and again 2005-2008. On the 
other hand ISSEDF has dropped sharply in 1984, 1989, 2001 and in 2009. ISSEDF tends to be low 
on recessions and high in economic booms. It also appears that ISSEDF reacts to smaller 
downturns which are not classified as recessions. For example in 1985 ISSEDF dropped sharply. In 
that year the upward trend of world’s economy lost some of its momentum because of the 
strengthened dollar. For example in Japan and Western Europe the increase in overall demand 
and production slowed down (World Economic Survey, United Nations, 1985). Period from 2001 
to 2003 is not officially a recession period but according to CEPR during this period European 
industrial production fell and private investments declined. On the other hand government 
consumption in Europe rose by 2.2% and 2.7% in 2001 and 2002, respectively. In the late 2003 
                                                 
 
11
 Output gap is the difference between potential GDP and actual GDP or actual output. The calculation for the 
output gap is Y*–Y where Y* is actual output and Y is potential output. 
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European economy started to show weak signs of recovery and this can also be seen from the 
issuer characteristic spread which started to increase already in 2004. From the perspective of the 
European high yield bond markets, it is also evident that ISSEDF has captured both high yield 
booms experienced in Europe. As shown in Figure 2, time series correspond closely to the 
historical accounts of credit cycle boom and busts. However, even though ISSEDF generally 
follows economic cycles, the correlation is less than perfect and the lead-lag relationship varies 
over time. 
6.2 The High Yield Share 
A second quality measure used in this thesis is formed using the credit ratings assigned to new 
corporate bond issues. High yield share12 is the principal amount of the high yield corporate bond 
issuances scaled by all public bond issuances. 
Figure 3 plots both ISSEDF and HYS to give a clear view from the variables. The time period is 
now shortened by almost ten years compared to the Figure 2, because of the lack of European 
high-yield bond market data before year 1998. As shown before, the high yield market did not 
start to develop rapidly in continental Europe until the euro currency was introduced to world 
financial markets as an accounting currency on 1st of January 1999. In Britain the first major 
speculative grade bond issues were made during the fiscal year 1998. High yield share in this 
study captures both euro and British pound denominated issuances. 
Similar to ISSEDF, HYS takes high values when the issuer quality is poor. The series plots well 
two previous high yield booms in Europe. It is noteworthy that between these booms the high-
yield credit issuance market was practically dead and this period characterized by the lack of new 
speculative grade issuances repeated itself again in 2009. It seems that on both times high yield 
share has reached its peak approximately one year earlier than ISSEDF. This phenomenon can be 
explained so that the bond market is more prone to negative market signals compared to the bank 
lending channels. In a market situation where the high yield market issuances do not find investor 
demand, banks still might be willing to finance lower quality companies. The correlation between 
annual ISSEDF and HYS is 40.8%.  
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 K`I  ∑ a7,7TU	b7WcX	∑ a7,7TU	b7WcX	 ∑ a7dVef\gXW	  , where Bi,t denotes the principal amount of bond issued in year t. 
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Figure 3 Annually measured ISSEDF and HYS 
This Figure plots the high yield share on new corporate bond issues on the right scale and for a comparison, ISSEDF 
on the left scale. ISSEDF compares the average default probability of high net debt issuers with the default probability 
of low net debt issuers. HYS is the fraction of non-financial corporate bond issues with a high yield rating obtained 
primary from Moody's. If Moody’s rating has not been available, S&P rating is used. 
 
Both HYS and ISSEDF capture the quality fluctuations in the credit markets but the advantage of 
HYS is its simplicity. However, HYS captures only bond issues and omits loan issues totally while 
ISSEDF includes both loan and bond market financing. In European framework this should make a 
significant difference because traditionally European companies have related heavily on bank 
financing. For example in late 1990s, 80% of external debt financing issued by German 
companies was bank loans (Zingales, 2003). Furthermore, if loan and bond markets were at least 
partially integrated components of the broader corporate credit markets, measures based on total 
debt issuance should be more informative about future bond returns. That assumption is 
supported at least by Becker and Ivashina (2010), who showed that firms substitute from loans to 
bonds at times characterized by tight lending standards, high levels of non-performing loans and 
loan allowances, low bank share prices and tight monetary policy. Finally, ISSEDF holds the 
definition of the firm quality constant over time. HYS in contrast relies on the assumption that the 
meaning of the credit ratings has remained constant. For example Servaes and Tamayo (2010) 
argued that the agencies have become more conservative in assigning ratings since 1970s.  
6.3 Univariate Forecasting Regressions 
This section presents how well issuer quality can explain excess bond returns. The aim is to show 
that regardless of the issuer quality barometer used, periods of poor issuer quality are followed by 
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low excess returns on corporate bonds. After that the methodology of Greenwood and Hanson 
(2011) is improved so that it better fits for the forecasting purposes. Finally, the results obtained 
by using the developed methodology are presented with the time-series controls.  
6.3.1. Annual Data 
Figure 4 shows one of the main results of this thesis. In short, it seems that periods of poor issuer 
quality are followed by low excess returns on corporate bonds. In Figure 4, annual ISSEDF is 
plotted alongside with cumulative high yield excess returns over the following two years. Returns 
are plotted in reverse scale so the negative correlation between series appears positive visually. 
The correlation between ISSEDF and 1-year excess high yield bond returns is -44% and for 2-year 
excess returns -68%. For 3-year excess returns the correlation decreases down to -19% and for 
longer time periods it practically disappears. Graphs for 3- and 4-year excess returns are not 
showed in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 Issuer quality and subsequent 1- and 2-year high yield excess bond returns 
This Figure plots issuer quality (left axis) alongside cumulative excess high yield bond returns at 1- and 2 year 
horizons (right axis). Returns are plotted in reverse scale. Issuer quality is measured with ISSEDF. ISSEDF is the 
difference between the average EDF quintile of high and low net debt issuers. 
 
 
As shown, the correlation between ISSEDF and high yield excess returns is significant at 1- and 2-
year horizons. However, obtained results do not directly mean that issuer characteristic spread 
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would be a good return forecasting tool. The problem is that methodology used by Greenwood 
and Hanson (2011) is inappropriate for real life forecasting in its original form. The reason for 
this is that value of ISSEDF should be known for the on-going year already in the beginning of the 
year, even though the financial figures needed cannot be available until the end of the year. 
In order to avoid this problem the issuer quality data is lagged in this study by one period. When 
using annual data this means that the issuer quality data from year t cannot be used before year 
t+1. The changed approach is presented in the equation (13). Lagging decreases the forecasting 
power of ISSEDF significantly; the correlation between ISSEDF and 1-year excess high yield bond 
returns is -28.6% and for 2-year excess returns the correlation is -19.9% compared to the previous 
-44% and -68%, respectively. From now on both ISSEDF and log(HYS) are lagged if not otherwise 
mentioned. The reason for this is the previously mentioned forecasting ability. 
k)l    m  n-  ok        (13) 
In equation (13) the issuer quality explains excess corporate bond returns. k)l 	denotes the 
cumulative 1-, 2-, 3- or 4-year excess returns on high yield bonds calculated in logarithmic form. 
n- denotes either annual ISSEDF or log(HYS)13. Both variables are lagged by one year. ok is 
the error term.  
Table 3 shows forecasting regressions of cumulative excess returns on quality measures. The top 
left regression in Panel A shows that ISSEDF has the coefficient of determination,  R2, of 0.12 for 
high yield excess returns at a 1-year horizon. The coefficient of -0.26 implies that one standard 
deviation rise in ISSEDF (0.38 quintiles) lowers excess high yield returns by 9.9% over the 
following year. When looking at the 2-year forecasting period, the R2 declines from 0.12 to 0.04. 
Also coefficient decrease in magnitude. 
 
 
                                                 
 
13Following Greenwood and Hanson (2011) log(HYS) with both annual and quarterly data is used because it provides 
a good fit but qualitatively similar results to HYS. The problem with logarithmic HYS is that there are periods when 
the HYS=0 and Log(HYS) cannot be calculated. For those periods HYS is set to be equal to the second smallest HYS 
value observed in the sample. 
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Table 3 Issuer quality and returns to corporate credit 
This Table shows the univariate time-series forecasting regression of log excess returns on issuance quality ISSEDF 
and on log(HYS) of the form pqrstu  v  w  xr-y  zrs. In Panel A, the dependent variable pqrstu 	is the 
cumulative 1-, 2-, 3, or 4-year excess return on high yield bonds calculated with Bank of America (BoFa) Merrill 
Lynch European Currency High Yield Bond - Index. In Panel B and C, the dependent variable is the cumulative 1-, 
2-, 3, or 4-year excess return on BBB- and AAA- rated corporate bonds calculated with BoFa Merrill Lynch Emu 
Corporate non-financial BBB- and AAA- rated bond indexes, respectively. X denotes either annually measured 
ISSEDF or log(HYS).  zrs is the error term.  t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West 
(1987) estimator allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
 
The reason for the low forecasting power lies on the lagged ISSEDF values. If the data is not 
lagged, the explanatory power of ISSEDF is concentrated in the first two years with some 
additional forecasting power at third year, but after that the forecasting power is ISSEDF 
disappears.14  
Moving down to Panel B and C, it is easy to see that the negative correlation between excess 
returns and ISSEDF remain similar to the Panel A. The main finding of the left side of Panels B 
and C is that the higher the bonds are rated, the lower the forecasting power of ISSEDF is. This 
pattern of coefficients is consistent with the model presented in section 3.1 in where the lower-
rated bonds had a greater exposure to a common credit-related factor.  
                                                 
 
14
 See Appendix 3 
1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year
b -0.26 -0.19 0.16 0.18 -0.29 -0.74 -0.78 -0.49
[t] [-2.39] [-1.79] [0.91] [1.72] [-3.09] [-3.03]        [-7.64] [-3.40]
R 2 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.43 0.78 0.38
b -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.05
[t] [-1.21] [-0.54] [1.26] [0.98] [0.31] [-0.56] [-0.39] [0.65]
R 2 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.05
b -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[t] [-0.74] [-0.55] [0.36] [1.27] [0.65] [-0.41] [-0.47] [-0.46]
R 2 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02
X t-1 =ISS EDF (annual) 1999-2010 X t-1 =log(HYS) (annual) 1999-2010
Panel A: High Yield Excess Returns (rxHY)
Panel B: BBB Excess Returns (rxBBB)
Panel C: AAA Excess Returns (rxAAA)
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The right half of the Table 3 shows the regression results when the log(HYS) is used as an 
independent variable instead of ISSEDF. Starting from the 1-year returns, the coefficient of -0.29 
implies that one standard deviation rise (0.30 quintiles) in log(HYS) reduces high yield excess 
returns by -8.8%. However, on the contrary to ISSEDF, the coefficient rises in magnitude when 
moving from 1- to 2-year forecasting horizon with some additional forecasting power at third 
year. It is also important to notice that the regression results from log(HYS) are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for the full 4-year forecasting horizon. After that the forecasting power 
of log(HYS) diminishes. The difference between ISSEDF and HYS can also be seen from the Figure 
2, where ISSEDF and log(HYS) are plotted alongside; Log(HYS) generally leads ISSEDF by 12-18 
months. This can be interpreted so that the high yield market is already closed when riskier 
companies still are able to raise debt funding from banks. Now when both variables are lagged, 
the proactive nature of high yield share gives us a relatively better forecasting power to excess 
bond returns.  
When moving down to Panel B and C, it is easy to see that the coefficients of log(HYS) remain 
generally negative also with BBB- and AAA-rated corporate bonds. Similar to the ISSEDF the 
forecasting power of HYS decreases already when forecasting BBB-rated bond returns and 
remains insignificant thereafter.  
Results presented in this section are analogical to those Greenwood and Hanson (2011) found by 
researching U.S corporates from 1962 to 2008. Greenwood and Hanson split their observation 
period to two subperiods, the latter starting from 1983. This division reflected the pre-high yield 
bond period and the period when the high yield bonds became liquid instruments. The predictive 
power of the results in this Section is similar when compared to the latter period in Greenwood 
and Hanson’s paper. However, this requires that the lagging for ISSEDF and Log(HYS) is ignored. 
Coefficients differ mainly because Greenwood and Hanson used deciles instead the quintiles. 
When taking also this difference into the account, the coefficients are almost identical. For 
example the ISSEDF coefficient for 2-year excess high yield bond returns measured with deciles is 
-0.19 in this study, whereas Greenwood and Hanson reported a coefficient of -0.21. When 
lagging is taken into the consideration, the results start to differ significantly; ISSEDF loses its 
statistical significance as excess bond returns predictor whereas log(HYS) remains a significant 
predictor.  
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6.3.2. Quarterly Data 
The short time period studied in this thesis (1998-2011) decreases the statistical significance of 
the obtained results and brings problems like multicollinearity to the regressions when the annual 
data is used. This problem can be at least partially solved by using quarterly data which basically 
quadruples the amount of observations. This reduces the multicollinearity between explanatory 
variables and increases the statistical significance of the results.  
Quarterly data is collected and computed analogically to annual data. For example equation (13) 
requires in its original form that all values in the equations should be annualized. The 
methodology presented in Chapter 4 can also be changed so that the raw quarterly financial and 
market data can be used but the increased volatility impairs the interpretation of the results. 
Therefore Merton’s DD model applied in this study is constructed with annualized volatility and 
asset drifts.  
 
Figure 5 Quarterly measured issuer quality and subsequent high yield bond returns 
This Figure shows the quarterly measured issuer quality fluctuations alongside with 1-year excess high yield bond 
returns. Issuer quality is measured with log(HYS). Log(HYS) is the log fraction of non-financial corporate bond 
issuance with a high yield rating obtained primary from Moody's. Log(HYS) is constructed using trailing 12-month 
high yield share data (left axis).  Cumulative excess high yield bond returns for the following year are plotted in 
reverse scale (right axis). 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that the main results of this thesis are neutral to the data frequency used; periods 
of poor issuer quality are followed by low excess returns on corporate bonds also when the 
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quarterly data is employed. Log(HYS) is shown as  12-months trailing average share of nominal 
high yield issuances. 1-year excess high yield bond returns are recorded cumulatively and plotted 
in reverse scale. The time period is shortened by two years compared to previous section where 
the annual data was used. The reason for this is that Thomson ONE Banker does not offer 
balance sheet data on quarterly bases exclusively before the end of year 2000. However, the 
magnitude of coefficients and the significance of results remain unchanged regardless of the time 
period used. Appendix 4 offers the requisite support for this argument. 
 
Table 4 Quarterly measured issuer quality and returns to corporate credits 
This Table presents the univariate time-series forecasting regression of log excess returns on quarterly measured 
issuer quality ISSEDF and log(HYS) of the form  pqrstu  v  w  xr-y  zrs. In Panel A, the dependent variable pqrstu 	is the cumulative 1-, 2-, 3, or 4-year excess return on high yield bonds calculated with Bank of America 
(BoFa) Merrill Lynch European Currency High Yield Bond - Index. In Panel B and C, the dependent variable is the 
cumulative 1-, 2-, 3, or 4-year excess return on BBB- and AAA- rated corporate bonds calculated with BoFa Merrill 
Lynch Emu Corporate non-financial BBB- and AAA- rated bond indexes, respectively. X denotes either ISSEDF or 
log(HYS) and zrs is the error term.  t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West 
(1987) estimator allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
Table 4 presents the univariate time-series forecasting regression of log excess returns on 
quarterly measured issuer quality ISSEDF and log(HYS). When analysing the results it is easy to 
notice that Table 4 offers a slightly different conclusion compared to the results presented in 
Table 3. In Table 3 the annual ISSEDF values lost their predictive power when ISSEDF was lagged 
but the same does not apply to the results calculated with more frequent data. Quarterly measured 
1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year
b -0.11 -0.19 -0.27 -0.20 -0.23 -0.38 -0.41 -0.56
[t] [-1.90] [-1.84] [-3.14] [-3.45] [-1.76] [-2.36] [-2.93] [-4.87]
R 2 0.07 0.12 0.43 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.38 0.64
b -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10
[t] [-1.49] [-1.34] [-1.86] [-1.14] [-1.94] [-2.60] [-2.97] [-2.85]
R 2 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.40
b 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
[t] [-0.43] [-0.70] [-2.73] [-3.92] [-0.97] [-0.70] [-0.40] [-3.37]
R 2 0.00 0.02 0.31 0.32 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.38
Panel C: AAA Excess Returns (rxAAA)
X t-1 =ISS EDF (quarterly, annualized debt change) X t-1 =log(HYS) (quarterly, annualized debt change)
Panel A: High Yield Excess Returns (rxHY)
Panel B: BBB Excess Returns (rxBBB)
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ISSEDF offers more accurate view from the credit market conditions compared to the situation 
where the issuer quality deterioration can be noted only once a year. In addition all results 
showed in Panels A, B and C are in line with the  reduced-form model presented in the third 
chapter. For example, the coefficients, i.e. the predictive power of issuer quality, decreases the 
higher rated the issuer companies are. The left half of the Panel A shows that the predictive 
power of ISSEDF is concentrated on first three years. For example the second column in Panel A 
shows that ISSEDF has an R2 of 0.12 for high yield excess returns at a 2-year horizon. The 
coefficient of -0.19 implies that one standard deviation rise in ISSEDF (0.46 quintiles) lowers 
excess high yield returns by 8.7% over the following two years.  
The right half of the Table 4 shows the regression results when log(HYS) is used as the 
explanatory variable. The negative correlation between the excess returns and the high yield 
share remains throughout the panels. The coefficient of -0.38 in Panel A at a 2-year horizon 
implies that a one standard deviation rise in log(HYS) (0.38 quintiles) lowers excess high yield 
returns by 14.4% over the following two years. For a 3-year horizon the rise of one standard 
deviation in ISSEDF and log(HYS) lowers future excess returns by 12.4% and 15.6%, respectively. 
Overall a consistent picture emerges whether the forecast is done by using quarterly measured 
ISSEDF or log(HYS). On the other hand it is clear that the annually measured ISSEDF can only 
show the current credit conditions but is a poor predictor of future excess returns. The difference 
between annually and quarterly observed log(HYS) is smaller compared to the annually and 
quarterly observed ISSEDF and the results obtained are more comparable with each other.  
6.4 Multivariate Forecasting Regressions 
The next step is to examine the incremental forecasting power of the results obtained by the 
univariate regressions. Following Greenwood and Hanson (2011) two sets of control variables 
are of interest. The first set tests whether issuer quality has any forecasting power beyond 
common proxies for ex-ante risk premium such as the term spread (Fama and French, 1989) or 
the short-term German Government Bond yield (modifying the results of Fama and Schwer, 
1977). The second set of control variables tests in what extent results in Table 3 and 4 are driven 
by firms responding to mean reversion in credit spreads or excess returns. If companies were 
more willing to issue debt capital when the credit spreads are on low level, the findings presented 
49 
 
in Tables 3 and 4 would be less useful for forecasting returns but still interesting from an 
economic point of view. 
The question, whether the issuance can contain any incremental information about returns that is 
not contained in other observables, is crucial for this thesis. When assuming that companies and 
individual managers respond naively to the changes in credit spreads, the answer for the question 
is negative. However, as noted by Greenwood and Hanson (2011), spreads mean different things 
at different times. Basically there are two environments where spreads are high. They may be 
wide because expected default losses are high or because expected returns are high. And as 
Greenwood and Hanson (2011) argued, issuance may contain information beyond spreads if 
companies issue more when they perceive credit as being cheap (i.e. expected returns for 
investors are low). If this assumption holds, ISSEDF and log(HYS) should remain their significant 
forecasting power especially in circumstances when the new economic boom is starting but 
interest rates are still at the low level.  
6.4.1. Multicollinearity in Multivariate Forecasting Regressions 
The usage of multivariate regressions together with cumulative time-series causes 
multicollinearity. For example issuer quality can be compared to the balance sheet items which, 
unlike income statement data, do not start from zero after each period. The same applies to the 
cumulative excess bond returns and the control variables like yields. The rolling nature of these 
variables combined to the short time period studied causes high correlation of explanatory 
variables, presented in Table 5.  
Greenwood and Hanson (2011) grouped controlling explanatory variables basically into three 
different categories. The first group included the gap between long and short-term government 
bond yield plus the yield of short-term government bonds. The second group contained the credit 
spread of BBB-rated bonds and the risk free government bonds as well as the last twelve month 
(LTM) excess returns. The third group included macroeconomic variables. In this thesis the 
multicollinearity is a problem especially inside these groups, not between them. If the 
multicollinearity is ignored, the R2 will be high but the individual variables themselves are not 
significant and get highly varying coefficients compared to the univariate regressions. This arises 
in the context of very closely related explanatory variables as a consequence of the difficulty in 
observing the individual contribution of each variable to the overall fit of the regression (Brooks, 
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2008). One solution for the multicollinearity is to drop all but one of the correlated variables or 
change them to a ratio. The dropping would decrease the comparability of the results to the 
previous studies and hence there is a strong theoretical reasoning for including correlated 
variables in the model.  
 
Table 5 Correlation matrix for control variables 
This Table shows the correlations of explanatory controlling variables: yGL,t -yGS,t  is the spread between the 10-year 
and 2-year German Government Bonds, yGS,t is the 2-year German Government Bond yield,   yBBB5y,t -yG5y,t is the 
credit spread between BBB-bond index and 5-year German Government Bonds.  rxHY is the one year lagged high 
yield bond excess returns. Rest of the variables are macroeconomic control variables. These variables include the 
output gap that is the difference between potential and actual gross domestic product, unemployment growth, 
industry production growth, individual consumption growth and the recession dummy. 
 
The problem with the closely related explanatory variables is solved in this thesis as follows. 
First term spread (yGL,t -yGS,t) and the short-term German Government Bond yield (yGS,t) are 
grouped together by employing the Principal Component Analysis (from now on PCA). Secondly 
the credit spread of BBB-rated and the risk-free Government Bonds (yBBB5y,t -yG5y,t)  and the last 
twelve month (LTM) excess returns (rxHY) are grouped together. BBB-rated bond index used in 
this study has historically had a maturity of five years.15 Therefore also the controlling German 
                                                 
 
15
 BoFa Merrill Lynch Emu Corporate non-financial BBB-rated bond index 
yGL,t-y
G
S,t y
G
S,t y
BBB
5y ,t-y
G
5y,t rx
HY
t Output gap
Un-
employment 
growth
Industry 
production 
growth
Individual 
consumption 
growth
Recession 
dummy
yGL,t-y
G
S,t 1.00 - - - - - - - -
yGS,t -0.79 1.00 - - - - - - -
yBBB5y ,t-y
G
5y ,t 0.17 -0.20 1.00 - - - - - -
rx
HY
t 0.26 -0.32 -0.64 1.00 - - - - -
Output gap
-0.75 0.89 -0.20 -0.37 1.00 - - - -
Unemployment 
growth 0.71 -0.73 0.40 0.10 -0.81 1.00 - - -
Industry production 
growth -0.37 0.36 -0.68 0.42 0.41 -0.70 1.00 - -
Individual 
consumption growth -0.53 0.63 -0.52 0.03 0.74 -0.88 0.80 1.00 -
Recession dummy 0.11 -0.14 0.62 -0.44 -0.15 0.37 -0.59 -0.37 1.00
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Government Bond has the same maturity. The third PCA-component is formed from the macro-
economic variables. Macro-economic variables include unemployment growth, industry 
production growth, individual consumption growth and the recession dummy. Following 
Greenwood and Hanson (2011), the output gap is kept separately.  
The rationale to use the PCA-component is clear; multicollinearity inside groups is significant 
and in all cases the PCA-component explains clearly over 80% control variables’ total variation. 
While the PCA-component reduces the multicollinearity in the sample, the high explanatory 
power of variables inside the each PCA-component enables the interpretation of PCA-component 
coefficients. The PCA-components are calculated by using the normalized loadings.  
6.4.2. Multivariate Regression Results 
Table 6 shows the return forecasting regression of the form:   
k)l    m  n-  $  h(j  hij   hij   h>!aaa  h>!j   )l  ok (14) 
where k)l 	 denotes 1-, 2-, 3- or 4-year cumulative excess returns on high yield bonds and n- 
denotes either ISSEDF or log(HYS). Term spread and short-term German Government Bond yields 
are grouped into one principal component denoted by h(j  hij   hij . Credit spread and 
LTM excess high yield bond returns form another principal component denoted by	h>!aaa 
h>!j   )l. In equation (14) letters (a-d) denotes the coefficients. ok is the error term. 
Table 6 shows the results derived from the quarterly data. In Panel A the n- is the quarterly 
measured log(HYS) and in Panel B quarterly measured ISSEDF.  In general, controlling the term 
spread, short-term German Government Bond yield, credit spread and lagged excess returns has 
significant impact on the coefficient on ISSEDF and log(HYS) at 1- and 2- year horizons but for 
longer periods the significance of control variables diminishes.  For example in the univariate 
forecasting regression the slope of coefficient for 2-year log(HYS) is -0.38 and when thee both 
PCA-components are added the coefficient becomes insignificant and positive. 
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Table 6 Multivariate forecasting regressions 
This Table shows the time-series forecasting regression of log excess returns on high-yield bonds on measures of debt issuer quality with and without time-series controls of the 
form: k)l    m  n-  $  h(j  hij   hij   h>!aaa  h>!j   )l  ok where k)l 	 denotes 1-, 2-, 3- or 4-year cumulative excess returns on high yield 
bonds. In panel A n- denotes quarterly measured log(HYS) from 2001 to 2011 and in Panel B n- denotes quarterly measured ISSEDF from 2001 to 2011. Term spread and 
short-term German Government Bond yields are grouped into one principal component denoted by h(j  hij   hij . Credit spread and LTM excess high yield bond returns 
form another principal component denoted by	h>!aaa  h>!j   )l=		ok is the error term. t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
log(HYS) -0.23 -0.19 -0.19 -0.09 -0.38 -0.24 -0.09 0.15 -0.41 -0.40 -0.45 -0.33 -0.56 -0.56 -0.66 -0.66
[-1.76] [-1.76] [-1.56] [-0.79] [-2.36] [-2.11] [-0.58] [1.23] [-2.93] [-3.44] [-2.72] [-2.30] [-4.87] [-4.64] [-4.75] [-4.41]
[y G L,t -y G S,t  +  y G S,t ] -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 0.00
[-3.59] [-0.79] [-2.95] [-4.46] [-2.48] [-2.88] [-0.12] [0.22]
[y BBB 5y,t -y G 5y,t  + rx HY t ] 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.13 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.05
[0.37] [1.60] [2.23] [4.74] [-0.41] [0.82] [-2.17] [-1.83]
R 2 0.15 0.42 0.16 0.46 0.25 0.52 0.39 0.75 0.38 0.51 0.38 0.52 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
ISS EDF -0.11 0.03 -0.13 0.00 -0.19 0.00 -0.20 -0.05 -0.27 -0.30 -0.27 -0.24 -0.20 -0.33 -0.14 -0.23
[-1.90] [0.31] [-2.17] [0.08] [-1.84] [0.07] [-2.41] [-0.91] [-3.14] [-2.60] [-3.24] [-1.97] [-3.45] [-4.17] [-2.22] [-2.20]
[y G L,t -y G S,t  +  y G S,t ] -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.05
[-2.08] [-2.48] [-2.85] [-2.92] [0.53] [-0.47] [2.19] [1.20]
[y BBB 5y,t -y G 5y,t  + rx HY t ] 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.12
[2.32] [3.28] [5.39] [8.07] [3.30] [4.21] [3.64] [2.70]
R 2 0.07 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.12 0.42 0.62 0.79 0.43 0.39 0.60 0.61 0.23 0.34 0.42 0.46
Panel B: Xt-1=ISSEDF(quarterly,annualized debt change)          
Panel A: Xt-1=log(HYS)(quarterly, annualized debt change)        
4-year returns3-year returns2-year returns1-year returns
53 
 
Simultaneously coefficient in univariate and multivariate regressions are -0.41 and -0.33 at a 3-
year horizon, respectively. Moving down to Panel B, the quarterly measured ISSEDF is regressed 
with control variables. Analogically to Panel A, at 1- and 2- year horizon the significance of 
ISSEDF disappears. At 3- and 4-year horizons controls have only a little impact on the coefficients 
and to their significance.  
To summarize, results presented in this section are twofold. First issuer quality does not have a 
significant forecasting power beyond common proxies for ex-ante risk premium at 1- and 2-year 
horizons. On the other hand proxies for ex-ante risk premium lose their significance at 3- and 4-
year horizons.  Observed results differ slightly from those of Greenwood and Hanson (2011). 
Their results remained significant also at 1- and 2-year horizons when they studied the hold time 
period from 1962 to 2008. However, issuer quality lost its predictive power at a 1-year horizon 
also in Greenwood and Hanson’s paper when the observation period was shortened to 25 years 
(1983- 2008).  
6.5 Quantity and Quality of Debt Issuances 
This section shows the relationship between the aggregate corporate credit growth, the quality of 
debt issuances and excess high yield bond returns.  As discussed in Section 3.1, there should be a 
negative relationship between the quality of debt issuances and the aggregate corporate credit 
growth. In practise this means that the issuer quality should deteriorate when the aggregate 
lending grows. This section shows that while the aggregate credit growth has some excess return 
forecasting power compared to ISSEDF, the variation in issuer quality still is a defining feature of 
credit cycle. 
Figure 6 reveals the high correlation between quantity and quality; the correlation between issuer 
quality and aggregate debt growth is 59% in 1981-2011. The correlation has also increased over 
time, being 53% in 1981-1997 and as high as 89% in 1998-2011.16 This raises a question whether 
issuer quality contains any information over and above the quantity of borrowing. In order to 
answer this question this section compares the forecasting power of issuer quality to aggregate 
                                                 
 
16
 Aggregate credit growth is also calculated by using the non-financial corporate debt growth data offered by 
European Central Bank. The data is reported from the year 1999 onwards. The correlation between ISSEDF and 
aggregate debt growth in this case is 0.74% from 1998 to 2011. 
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credit growth. Sample firms are also grouped into five groups parallel to quintiles used in ISSEDF 
compilation (denoted from ∆D1/ D1 to ∆D5/ D5). Following Greenwood and Hanson (2011) the 
assumption is that the debt growth amongst the low quality firms contains the most valuable 
information about future corporate bond returns.  
 
Figure 6 Issuer quality and credit growth 
This Figure plots annually measured ISSEDF from year 1981 on the left axis. The aggregate sample credit growth 
(dashed line, dark grey) and the aggregate credit growth in Europe reported by ECB from year 1999 onwards (dashed 
line, light grey) are presented on the right axis. Issuer quality, ISSEDF, is the difference between the average EDF 
quintile of high and low net debt issuers. 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows the forecasting regression of cumulative 3-year high yield excess returns without 
and with controls in Panel A and B, respectively. The first three columns compare the forecasting 
power of aggregate debt growth and quarterly measured ISSEDF. Greenwood and Hanson (2011) 
found that ISSEDF forecast returns over and above the aggregate credit growth and figures in 
Table 7 support their observations; the forecasting power of quarterly measured ISSEDF remains 
significant when regressed with aggregate debt growth. Also quarterly measured high yield share 
outperforms aggregate debt growth with and without controls.  Actually log(HYS) is less affected 
by aggregate debt growth compared to ISSEDF. Results for the high yield share are presented in 
Appendix 5.   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Issuer Quality ISS EDF -0.27 -0.28
[-3.14] [-2.08]
Agg. Debt growth ∆D Agg /D Agg -0.10 0.00
[-2.18] [0.05]
Low EDF ∆D 1 /D 1 -0.09 -0.02 -0.11
[-2.31] [-0.02] [-2.51]
2 ∆D 2 /D 2 -0.12
[-2.26]
3 ∆D 3 /D 3 -0.10
[-2.52]
4 ∆D 4 /D 4 -0.10
[-1.83]
High EDF ∆D 5 /D 5
-0.11 -0.11
[-2.59] [-1.58]
High-Low ∆D 5 /D 5  - ∆D 1 /D 1 -0.06 -0.11
[-1.00] [-1.58]
R 2 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.33 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.04 0.29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Issuer Quality ISS EDF -0.24 -0.20
[-1.97] [-1.54]
Agg. Debt growth ∆D Agg /D Agg -0.05 -0.05
[-1.23] [-0.56]
Low EDF ∆D 1 /D 1 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08
[-1.57] [-1.28] [-1.49]
2 ∆D 2 /D 2 -0.09
[-1.70]
3 ∆D 3 /D 3 -0.02
[-0.86]
4 ∆D 4 /D 4 -0.07
[-1.20]
High EDF ∆D 5 /D 5 -0.06 -0.02
[-1.41] [-0.39]
High-Low ∆D 5 /D 5  - ∆D 1 /D 1 0.04 -0.02
[0.78] [-0.39]
R 2 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.53 0.55 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.47 0.53
Panel A: Univariate
Panel B: Multivariate
Table 7 Quantity, quality and future returns to credit 
This Table shows the forecasting power of quantity and quality to future returns on credit. Quarterly measured trailing 12-month univariate regression is of the form: 	pqrstu v  w  xr-y  zrs and time-series controlled multivariate regressions is of the form: pqr{tu  v  w  xr-y  |  }~r  }r   }r   }}r  }}r   pqrtu zr{. pqr{tu  denotes the cumulative 3-year excess return on high yield bonds and  Xt-1 stands for quarterly measured ISSEDF. Term spread and short-term German Government 
Bond yields are grouped into one principal component denoted by }~r  }r   }r . Credit spread and LTM excess high yield bond returns form another principal 
component denoted by	}}r  }}r   pqrtu=		  zrs is the error term.  ∆DAgg/DAgg is the annual percentage change in total debt for companies and ∆Dk/Dk denotes the 
aggregate debt growth of quintiles. Panel A shows regressions without and Panel B with principal component controls. t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) 
autocorrelation up to k-lags.        
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Column (1) in Panel A shows the baseline results for the quarterly measured ISSEDF at a 3-year 
horizon. Column (2) shows that the aggregate corporate credit growth has a negative relationship 
with excess high yield corporate bond returns. The result is significant at the 5% level (two-sided 
critical value). The aggregate credit growth, however, is less significant 3-year excess bond 
return predictor than ISSEDF. This can be seen by analysing the column (3). The relationship 
remains unchanged when time-series variables are controlled in Panel B.  
Columns (4)-(8) in Table 7 compare the forecasting power of debt growth for firms in EDF 
quintiles from 1 to 5. To preserve the comparison across columns each series is standardized to 
have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns (4)-(8) shows that while the higher 
quintiles have better forecasting power to high yield excess bond returns on average, the 
relationship is not fully linear; the second quintile has the highest forecasting power. In addition 
the differences between coefficients are small. For example one standard deviation rise in ∆D1/ 
D1 lowers return by 9% over the next 3-year horizon whereas one standard deviation rise in ∆D5/ 
D5 lowers the returns only by 11%. The conclusion is that the actual debt growth of low and high 
net debt issuers is not a dominant feature of the credit cycle but the characteristic spread between 
these two groups is.  
Column (9) in Table 7 shows how well low and high quality firms jointly forecast credit returns. 
In both Panels A (without the time-series controls) and B (with the time-series controls) results 
from this regression are insignificant. Parallel way to measure issuer quality is to compare the 
difference of ∆D5/ D5 and ∆D1/ D1 done in column (10). This approach is corresponds to ) 
	( in equation (7). The difference is that ISSEDF compares the expected default frequencies of 
high and low debt issuance firms whereas ∆D5/ D5 - ∆D1/ D1 compares the debt growth of high 
and low EDF firms. As seen from the column (10), ∆D5/ D5 - ∆D1/ D1 negatively forecasts future 
returns and this remains true even after controlling for debt growth at high quality firms in 
column (11) in Panel A. However, the statistical significance of the results is low and the 
negative relationship disappears when the time-series controls are added to the regression in 
Panel B.   
Columns (1)-(3) in Panel B show that ISSEDF remains significant in relation to aggregate debt 
growth even after the time-series controls are added. On the other hand, the aggregate debt 
growth and subsequently quintiles on the columns (4)-(11) lose their statistical significance. This 
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means that the debt growth of aggregate companies does not forecast excess bond returns over 
and above traditional proxies for risk premium. Findings in Panel B further verify the results 
obtained in Panel A:  aggregate debt growth has only a little forecasting power when regressed 
with ISSEDF. Further it seems that only the characteristic spread between high and low net debt 
issuers forecast bond returns with the high accuracy, not the actual debt growth of these two 
groups.  
6.6 Robustness Checks 
This section tests the robustness of the results reported earlier in this chapter. First the obtained 
results in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 are tested with macro variables and equity returns for both ISSEDF 
and log(HYS). After that several variations of issuer characteristic spread are constructed to test 
the sensitivity of the results to the different measures of issuer quality. 
6.6.1. Macro Controls and Equity Returns 
Table 8 shows the robustness specifications for both ISSEDF in Panel A and log(HYS) in Panel B 
with and without the usual time series controls. Time-series controls are in the principal 
component form and constructed as described in Section 6.4.1.17  
Following Greenwood and Hanson (2011) number of additional control variables are added to the 
baseline forecast returns. The first control variable is the output gap, reported by OECD (2011). 
The output gap is the difference between potential and actual gross domestic product. The output 
gap does not have a significant forecasting power over ISSEDF or log(HYS). When regressed with 
multivariate equation, output gap even strengthens the baseline results. Secondly the baseline 
results are regressed with the current high yield default rates reported by Moody’s (Moody’s 
Investors Service, 2011). Both ISSEDF and log(HYS) are affected by the trailing 12-month default 
rates in some extent but maintain their statistical significance.  
 
 
                                                 
 
17
 Term spread (yGL,t -yGS,t) and the short term German Government Bond yield (yGS,t) are grouped together into one 
PCA-component. Further, Credit spread of BBB-rated and the risk-free Government Bonds (yBBB5y,t -yG5y,t)  and the 
last twelve month (LTM) excess returns (rxHY) are grouped to another PCA-component. 
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b [t] R2 b [t] R2
Baseline results -0.27 [-3.14] 0.43 -0.24 [-1.97] 0.61
Additional Controls:
Output Gap -0.30 [-2.87] 0.44 -0.21 [-2.03] 0.63
High Yield Default rates -0.19 [-1.93] 0.47 -0.25 [-1.54] 0.61
Macro-economic Variables -0.19 [-1.95] 0.51 -0.24 [-1.95] 0.61
All Variables -0.14 [-1.30] 0.53 -0.24 [-1.49] 0.61
Lags of Variables -0.17 [-1.28] 0.47 -0.22 [-1.46] 0.61
Link to Equity Markets
Concurrent Equity Returns -0.36 [-2.67] 0.47 -0.27 [-1.89] 0.63
Concurrent lagged Equity Returns -0.36 [-3.02] 0.50 -0.25 [-1.95] 0.63
Concurrent Euity Return Volatility -0.17 [-1.30] 0.46 -0.23 [-1.45] 0.61
Concurrent lagged Returns Volatility -0.18 [-1.68] 0.46 -0.20 [-1.56] 0.62
Baseline result -0.41 [-2.93] 0.38 -0.33 [-2.30] 0.52
Additional Controls:
Output Gap -0.42 [-3.29] 0.44 -0.33 [-2.32] 0.52
High Yield Default rates -0.27 [-1.54] 0.40 -0.31 [-1.96] 0.52
Macro-economic Variables -0.29 [-2.30] 0.50 -0.28 [-1.70] 0.54
All Variables -0.21 [-1.46] 0.51 -0.23 [-1.15] 0.54
Lags of Variables -0.23 [-1.78] 0.47 -0.20 [-0.88] 0.53
Link to Equity Markets
Concurrent Equity Returns -0.40 [-3.08] 0.45 -0.42 [-1.43] 0.53
Concurrent lagged Equity Returns -0.44 [-3.47] 0.45 -0.34 [-1.61] 0.52
Concurrent Euity Return Volatility -0.36 [-2.09] 0.38 -0.42 [-2.79] 0.53
Concurrent lagged Returns Volatility -0.33 [-2.22] 0.40 -0.36 [-2.62] 0.52
Univariate With time-series controls
Panel A: X t-1 =ISS EDF (quarterly, annualized debt change) 
Panel B: X t-1 =log(HYS) (quarterly, annualized debt change)
Table 8 Robustness of the issuer quality metrics 
This Table shows the robustness of the results presented earlier in Chapter 6. For univariate regressions the results 
are obtained by using the following regression: pqrstu  v  w  xr-y  zrs and for multivariate regressions by 
using the following regression: pqr{tu  v  w  xr-y  |  }~r  }r   }r   }}r  }}r   pqrtu zr{. The dependent variable pqr{tu  is the 3-year cumulative excess log return on high yield bonds. In Panel A xr-ydenotes ISSEDF and in Panel B, xr-y denotes log(HYS). Term spread and short-term German Government Bond 
yields are grouped into one principal component denoted by}~r  }r   }r . Credit spread between BBB-rated 
and risk-free bond yield plus LTM excess high yield bond returns form another principal component denoted 
by	}}r  }}r   pqrtu=		zrs is the error term. Additional controls include Output gap that is the difference 
between potential and actual gross domestic product, past High yield bond default rates and Macro-economic 
variables that are grouped into one PCA-component including trailing twelve month unemployment growth, 
industrial production growth, individual consumption growth and the recession dummy. All variables include all 
control additional controls. Concurrent equity returns and Concurrent equity return volatility are based on weighted 
market movements of the sample companies. t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation up to k-
lags.   
 
 
 
 
Macro-economic variables 
on third row in Table 8 contain trailing twelve month 
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unemployment growth, industrial production growth, individual consumption growth and the 
recession dummy. These variables are grouped as one PCA-component in order to avoid 
multicollinearity in the sample. The data is from the ECB database18 and contains the weighted 
average figures for 17 Euro countries. The last two columns specify the results where all control 
variables are regressed together with the baseline results. On fourth row the variables are 
regressed without lagging. Fifth row presents the results where all variables are lagged by one 
period. Both log(HYS)and ISSEDF are more heavily affected than before but still correlate 
negatively with the excess bond returns.  
“Link to Equity Markets” parts of the Table 8 compare equity returns and return volatility to the 
obtained baseline regressions. As seen, neither ISSEDF nor log(HYS) is affected by the 12-month 
trailing volatility of equity returns or the actual trailing cumulative returns. This supports the 
view that the credit cycle differs somewhat from the actual business cycle.  
When comparing the obtained results to the previous literature, the differences are clear. 
Greenwood and Hanson (2011) reported robust results even after controlling ISSEDF and log(HYS) 
with all above mentioned variables. In addition they found that neither the consumption wealth 
ratio developed by Ludvigson and Ng (2001) nor the linear combination of forward interest rates 
of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), has impact on the estimated coefficients on ISSEDF. While the 
findings of this thesis are robust when regressed with equity returns, the statistical significance of 
the results is in general affected when all control variables are included. In few cases the t-value 
drops down to 1.30 in univariate regressions which equals 20% level at two-sided t-test.  
However, in general obtained results in this section are significant at the 10% significance level. 
6.6.2. Alternative Construction of ISSEDF 
The next step is to test how different adjustments to the construction of ISSEDF affect to the 
results obtained earlier.  The high yield share is relatively simple quality measurement tool but 
the ISSEDF is more subjective way to measure issuer quality. Therefore this section constructs 
different compilations for ISSEDF and after that measures issuer quality with totally different 
techniques. Table 9 shows the main results of these tests.  
                                                 
 
18
 http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ 
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The first row in Table 9 shows the results for actual level of ISSEDF. Original equation for ISSEDF 
split the observations into the quintiles to eliminate the effect of outliers. It seems that the usage 
of quintiles also increases the statistical significance of the results because t-values for ISSEDF are 
slightly higher compared to the actual levels of ISSEDF. Second and third row in Table 9 show 
whether the maturity of debt issuances makes any difference at all.  
 
Table 9 Alternative measures of issuer and credit quality 
This Table analyses the different measures of issuer and credit quality. For univariate regressions the results are 
obtained by using the following regression: pqrstu  v  w  xr-y  zrs and for time-series controlled 
multivariate regressions by using the following regression: pqr{tu  v  w  xr-y  |  }~r  }r   }r  }}r  }}r   pqrtu  zr{. The dependent variable pqr{tu  is the 3-year cumulative excess log return on high 
yield bonds. xr-y is a changing quality measure. Term spread and short-term German Government Bond yields are 
grouped into one principal component denoted by }~r  }r   }r . Credit spread between BBB-rated and risk-
free bond yield plus LTM excess high yield bond returns form another principal component denoted by	}}r }}r   pqrtu=		zrs is the error term. The upper part of Table shows alternative constructions for ISSEDF and the 
lower part alternative measures of credit quality. Table reports the coefficient and t-statistic as well as the regression 
R2. t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation up to k-lags.  
 
High yield excess returns are regressed with both long term and short-term liabilities growth but 
the basic conclusions remain unchanged: both long and short-term liability growth predict 
negatively excess bond returns at a 3-year horizon. The fourth row in Table 9 shows the 
b [t] R2 b [t] R2
Baseline results -0.27 [-3.14] 0.43 -0.24 [-1.97] 0.61
Alternative Constructions of ISSEDF
Level of EDF -3.96 [2.81] 0.42 -2.85 [-1.67] 0.62
Long term Debt iss. EDF -0.22 [-3.31] 0.36 -0.10 [-1.53] 0.49
Short-term Debt iss. EDF -0.30 [-3.06] 0.28 -0.11 [-1.34] 0.47
Equity iss. EDF -0.10 [-1.69] 0.09 0.02 [-0.37] 0.39
Market Cap Weighted EDF -0.24 [-3.57] 0.33 -0.13 [-1.92] 0.51
EDF, decile -0.12 [-3.40] 0.35 -0.06 [-1.57] 0.51
Alternative measures of Credit Quality
Shumway Distress -0.36 [-2.76] 0.31 -0.30 [-2.32] 0.62
Leverage (debt/Assets) -0.21 [-2.57] 0.15 0.02 [0.43] 0.46
CAPM σ -0.34 [-2.05] 0.20 -0.20 [-1.05] 0.50
Dividends (Non-payer – Payer) -0.53 [-0.84] 0.04 0.01 [0.01] 0.45
Size log(MV), (Small – Big) -0.02 [-0.09] 0.00 -0.11 [-0.97] 0.46
Age (young – old) -0.27 [-2.35] 0.34 -0.13 [-1.20] 0.49
Univariate With time-series controls
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characteristic spread of low and high net equity issuers. Changes in equity capital do not seem to 
have that strong predictive power than the debt issuances have. When the trailing 12-month debt 
changes are market cap weighted on the fifth row, the statistical significance of the results 
slightly rises in univariate regressions. Finally, following the methodology of Greenwood and 
Hanson (2011) companies are divided in deciles instead of quintiles. Therefore companies are 
divided quarterly to ten different categories instead of five categories (quintiles). Quintiles were 
used in this study primary because they offered better comparability with quantity measures used 
in Table 7. Regardless of the segmentation method applied, univariate regression results remain 
significant at the 1% significance level. 
The lower part of the Table 9 classifies the alternative measures of credit quality and hence 
challenges ISSEDF. First, opposed to EDF, Shumway’s (2001) bankruptcy predictor is used. It 
seems that Shumway’s model is also a strong predictor of returns. In a matter of fact it wins the 
horserace against ISSEDF. Further, the existence of time-varying agency costs is tested on second 
row with the leverage. The assumption is that companies with higher leverage get debt financing 
easier when agency costs are low, i.e. during the economic booms. The assumption holds and 
results are significant in univariate regression. However, when regressed together with time-
series control, leverage loses its predictive power. The third row tests the predictive power of 
residual’s volatility from trailing 12-month market-model regression. Results suggest that 
CAPM-volatility can forecast future excess high yield bond returns. Results are analogical to the 
baseline results, even though the statistical significance deteriorates more when regressed with 
the time-series controls.  
The fourth row in the lower part of the Table 9 tests the predictive power of dividends. The 
assumption is that non-dividend payers are riskier than dividend payers. The relationship between 
debt changes of non-dividend payers and excess bond returns is negative but significantly less 
significant than ISSEDF. Finally the predictive power of company size and age are tested on the 
fifth and sixth rows. While both size and age have a negative relationship with future excess bond 
returns, only the age is statistically significant return predictor. It seems that even though smaller 
firms issue slightly more debt during credit booms, market cap weighted debt changes do not 
significantly improve the forecasting power of ISSEDF. Thus, obtained results suggest that market 
cap weighting is not required when studying the issuer quality deterioration.  
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6.6.3. Bootstrapped Results 
The accuracy of sample estimated in this thesis is tested with bootstrapping. Before the 
bootstrapping process, baseline results are compared with the results that are not adjusted with 
Newey-West (1987) standards errors. Table shows that the results remain basically unchanged for 
both log(HYS) and ISSEDF. After that the regressions that are not Newey-West adjusted are 
bootstrapped using the resampling method and 1,000 bootstrap replications. As expected ISSEDF 
is more unstable compared to log(HYS).  
 
Table 10 Bootstrapped p-values for quarterly measured ISSEDF and log(HYS) 
This Table shows the bootstrapped univariate time-series forecasting regression of log excess returns on quarterly 
measured issuance quality ISSEDF and log(HYS). The equation used is of the form: k)l    m  n-  ok 
where k)l 	is the cumulative 1-, 2- or 3-year excess return on high yield bonds calculated with Bank of America 
(BoFa) Merrill Lynch European Currency High Yield Bond - Index. n- denotes either ISSEDF or log(HYS). ok is 
the error term. Controls include “Rates” (PCA-component for term spread and short-term risk-free bond yield), 
“Credit” (PCA-component for credit spread and past high yield bond returns) and “All” which includes both 
“Credit” and “Rates”. t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West (1987) estimator 
allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
In general bootstrapped p-values are not significant at the 5% level at 1- and 2-year horizons but 
become significant at 3- and 4-years horizons. Results for a 4-year horizon are not presented in 
this context but are slightly more stable than the results for a 3-year horizon.   
[t] Newey-West (NW) -0.11 0.03 -0.13 0.00 -0.19 0.01 -0.20 -0.05 -0.27 -0.30 -0.27 -0.24
[-1.90] [0.31] [-2.17] [0.08] [-1.84] [0.08] [-2.41] [-0.91] [-3.14] [-2.60] [-3.24] [-1.97]
Non-NW adjusted -0.11 0.03 0.13 0.00 -0.19 0.01 -0.20 -0.05 -0.27 -0.30 -0.27 -0.24
[-1.52] [0.39] [2.02] [0.07] [-1.95] [0.08] [-3.08] [-0.81] [-4.24] [-3.33] [-4.89] [-2.98]
Bootstrapped p-value 0.015 0.730 0.014 0.930 0.021 0.937 0.016 0.324 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.066
Controls None Rates Credit All None Rates Credit All None Rates Credit All
[t] Newey-West (HAC) -0.23 -0.19 -0.19 -0.09 -0.38 -0.24 -0.09 0.15 -0.41 -0.40 -0.45 -0.33
[-1.76] [-1.76] [-1.56] [-0.79] [-2.39] [-2.11] [-0.58] [1.24] [-2.93] [-3.44] [-2.71] [-2.30]
Non-NW adjusted -0.23 -0.19 -0.19 -0.09 -0.38 -0.24 -0.09 0.15 -0.41 -0.40 -0.45 -0.33
[-2.54] [-2.44] [-1.57] [-0.88] [-3.27] [-2.40] [-0.59] [1.47] [-4.18] [-4.43] [-3.18] [-2.44]
Bootstrapped p-value 0.019 0.029 0.059 0.359 0.005 0.012 0.427 0.121 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.02
Controls None Rates Credit All None Rates Credit All None Rates Credit All
Panel B: log(HYS)(quarterly,annualized)                    
1-year returns: rxHYt+1 2-year returns: rxHYt+2 3-year returns: rxHYt+3
Panel A: ISSEDF(quarterly,annualized)          
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Finally the autoregressive-moving average (ARMA) nature of the univariate regressions is tested. 
Appendix 6 presents results for the ARMA(p,q)-model. It shows that the current value of the 
univariate regressions depends linearly on their own previous values plus a combination of 
current and previous values of a white noise error term. Both Aike’s and Bayesian information 
criterion are used and both criteria are minimized with ARMA(2,1)-model (Burnham and 
Anderson, 2002). The linear dependence is natural because the most of the indicators for issuer 
quality are cumulative by their nature.  
 
 
7 REASONS FOR THE NEGATIVE EXCESS BOND RETURNS 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that deteriorating debt issuer quality forecasts low excess returns on 
corporate bonds. This chapter evaluates different reasons for this phenomenon. Sections 7.1 and 
7.2 go through explanations suggesting that either the quantity or the price of risk varies over the 
credit cycle. After that Section 7.3 discusses whether the variation in intermediary balance sheet 
strength can forecast excess bond returns. Finally, possible “reaching for yield” and investor 
over-extrapolation are discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5.  
7.1 Time Variation in the Quantity of Risk 
The classic theory of finance suggests that riskier assets should have higher expected return target 
compared to lower risk assets. Analogically the lower quality debt issuance should be associated 
with a larger quantity of risk and hence, higher forecasted returns. The findings of this thesis are 
contrary. As sawn in Chapter 6, a shift towards lower quality issuance actually lowers the 
expected future returns, not the opposite as would have been expected. Therefore the 
explanations, that expected returns are mechanically linked to the composition of bonds in the 
high yield index, can be ruled out. Excess high yield bond returns cannot either be explained with 
equity market returns. Table 8 in Chapter 6 showed that when regressed with stock returns, 
neither ISSEDF nor log(HYS) lose its forecasting power. To sum up, results of this thesis suggest 
that high values of ISSEDF and log(HYS) are associated with higher, not lower, future stock 
market returns.   
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7.2 Fluctuations in the Price of Risk 
The next step is to consider explanations in which time-variation in required returns is due to 
changes in the rationally determined price of risk. This assumption is not totally new because 
some consumption-based models recognize countercyclical variations in the price of risk.  For 
example Campbell and Cochrane (1999) argued that the equity risk premium is higher at business 
cycle troughs than it is at peaks and Bansal and Yaron (2004) showed that dividend yields predict 
equity returns and the volatility of returns is time-varying. In addition Chen, Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2009) on their turn have argued that the habit formation models can explain the low 
level of defaults relative to the BBB-AAA spread assuming that default losses are countercyclical. 
Under these explanations, the decline in required return during booms leads to a decline in issuer 
quality because the declining price of risk enables also lower quality firms undertake investment 
opportunities.19 This emphasises that investors should not be systematically surprised when the 
low quality firms, that get debt funding during the booms, underperform later on.   
Greenwood and Hanson (2011) showed that issuer quality significantly forecast negative excess 
returns on high yield bonds in a number of sample years. In their study ISSEDF forecasted 
negative 3-year cumulative excess returns for the full inspection period (1962-2008), and all but 
once this was actually followed by negative excess returns at 95% confidence level. These 
findings are strongly inconsistent with consumption based models. Consumption-based models20 
can explain periods in which high yield bonds have larger or smaller risk premiums but they are 
not capable to generate negative risk premiums.   
Finally, as shown before, issuer quality is disconnected from traditional predictors of stock 
market returns. Table 8 in Chapter 6 showed that the negative relationship between issuer quality 
and excess bond returns remained significant also once controlled with equity returns or equity 
volatility at 3- and 4-year horizons. Results remained unchanged also with alternative measures 
of quality. These findings suggest that issuer quality captures market movements that are 
                                                 
 
19
 Assuming that companies finance their projects with debt and differ only in their risk exposure, t. These firms 
starts investment I at time t in expectation t+1 only if the I E(CF)/Et(rxt+1) or the risk of the project is less risky than 
the individual company is (Greenwood and Hanson, 2011). 
20
 Such as those featuring habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) or  time-varying consumption volatility 
(Bansal and Yaron, 2004) 
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relatively specific to credit markets. In addition these results are also consistent with the study of 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) who argued that monthly credit spread changes are 
principally driven by local supply and demand chocks. 
7.3 Intermediaries’ Role in High Yield Bond Returns 
This section considers the health of intermediaries’ balance sheet as explanatory factor to excess 
high yield bond returns. As discussed in literature review, several existing papers, (Garleanu and 
Pedersen, 2010; Kashyap Stein and Wilcox, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; and Holmström 
and Tirole, 1997) have argued that fluctuations in intermediary equity capital or balance sheet 
health impact risk premiums. These theories propose that ISSEDF and HYS should be high when 
intermediary balance sheets are strong. However, Adrian Moench and Shin (2010) argued that the 
coefficient of ISSEDF should vanish once the intermediary balance sheet strength is controlled. 
The reason for this is that, according to Adrian Moench and Shin, intermediary capital is the 
driver of risk premium. The last assumption is not supported by the empirical study of 
Greenwood and Hanson (2011). Greenwood and Hanson found that while explanations involving 
limited capital go in the right direction, they do not fully explain the predictive power of ISSEDF.  
Table 11 describes the relationship between ISSEDF and the balance sheet strength of 
intermediaries. The left side of Table 11 examines the relationship between the intermediary 
health Zt and ISSEDF. 
HIIEQD    m    $  hN  hI   hI    hGh  hGh #  K`  ok   (15) 
In equation (15) HIIEQD is the difference between the average EDF quintile of high and low debt 
issuers. Zt is the combined effect of equity to assets ratio (E/A) and annual asset change (dA/A) to 
different intermediaries. Term spread and short-term German Government Bond yields are 
grouped to one principal component denoted by h(j  hij   hij . Credit spread between 
BBB-rated and risk free bonds plus LTM excess high yield bond returns form another principal 
component denoted by	h>!aaa  h>!j   )l	. Error term is denoted by ok. Results from 
these regressions are shown in the first two columns of Table 11. The remaining four columns 
describe the relationship between intermediary balance sheet health and excess high yield bond 
returns. This relationship is described in Equation (16).  
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)l    m  HII-EQD  -  $hN  hI   hI    hGh  hGh #  K`  o (16) 
The financial intermediary data is collected from Thomson ONE Banker database. All companies 
in this exercise operate in Europe and have been publicly traded at least in some point during the 
last thirteen years. Only companies that end their financial period in year-end are counted in. The 
final sample consists of 69 insurers, 130 broker-dealers and 245 banks. To ensure the 
comparability of the data, balance sheet ratios are normalized.  
The first section of Table 11 shows the result for European insurance companies, which together 
with pension funds manage assets of some $40 trillion (Praet, 2011). The drawback in this 
approach is that it omits European non-listed pension funds, which form an important group of 
investors for fixed income securities.  But even with this disadvantage the results are clear and 
significant. The first two columns of the insurer balance sheet section show the relationship with 
ISSEDF and balance sheet health is positive, i.e. issuer quality is poor when insurer balance sheets 
are strong. This finding is supported by previous papers of Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010), He 
and Krishnamurthy (2008) and Garleanau and Pedersen (2010). The second and the third section 
of Table 11 show that the results from banks’ balance sheets are alike: ISSEDF has been high when 
banks’ and broker-dealers’ balance sheets have been strong. However, obtained results for 
broker-dealers are more mixed and not statistically significant when time-series controls are 
added.  
The remaining four columns (3)-(6) in Table 11 analyse how well intermediaries’ balance sheet 
changes describe high yield bond returns. Especially columns (4) and (6) are in interest, because 
they show whether the coefficient on ISSEDF attenuate once intermediary balance sheet is 
controlled. Obtained results suggest that the coefficient on ISSEDF really decreases when banks’ 
and insurers’ balance sheets are controlled. On the other hand the broker dealers’ balance sheets 
do not attenuate the predicting power of ISSEDF.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insurer Balance Sheet ISS EDF -0.07 -0.07
[-0.75] [-0.72]
E/A insurer 3.34 1.75 1.85 2.29 3.35 2.76
[1.89] [0.78] [1.97] [2.50] [2.19] [1.96]
dA/A insurer 13.77 17.29 -11.17 -11.91 -8.67 -9.33
[2.26] [2.67] [-3.56] [-3.92] [-2.80] [-2.37]
Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
R 2 0.41 0.53 0.61 0.73 0.72 0.76
Broker-Dealer Balance Sheet ISS EDF -0.31 -0.19
[-4.29] [-2.60]
E/A BD 4.00 -2.20 -1.62 0.25 -0.15 -0.75
[2.39] [-0.94] [-1.37] [0.20] [-0.27] [-0.79]
dA/A BD -65.17 107.79 -271.53 -219.36 -299.21 -249.70
[-2.56] [1.17] [-2.18] [-2.81] [-4.27] [-4.94]
Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
R 2 0.21 0.42 0.32 0.70 0.78 0.83
Bank Balance Sheet ISS EDF -0.12 -0.23
[-1.02] [-1.75]
E/A Bank 13.20 13.83 1.23 2.26 2.41 3.61
[2.05] [2.30] [-0.22] [0.35] [0.67] [1.28]
dA/A Bank 14.86 13.23 -9.09 -6.63 -12.47 -9.44
[4.43] [2.24] [-2.20] [-1.59] [-2.70] [-2.71]
Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
R 2 0.51 0.57 0.44 0.47 0.66 0.74
Lagged Bank Stock Returns ISS EDF -0.28 -0.25
[-1.85] [-1.75]
R bank, t-1,t 0.56 0.51 -0.14 0.01 0.03 0.05
[4.49] [3.60] [-1.64] [0.05] [0.44] [0.62]
Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
R 2 0.41 0.47 0.18 0.43 0.12 0.61
Bank Loan Loss Provisions ISS EDF -0.29 -0.22
[-3.28] [-2.18]
Loan Losses -17.86 45.00 -33.13 -59.35 -64.47 -68.38
[-0.67] [0.82] [-0.82] [-2.07] [-1.84] [-2.70]
Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
R 2 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.50 0.48 0.69
Dep. Var. ISSEDF Dep.Var rxHYt+3
Table 11 Intermediary balance sheet and issuer quality 
This Table explores the relationship between ISSEDF and intermediary balance sheet strength, Zt. Columns (1)-(2) in 
each panel report the coefficient on Zt without and with time-series controls:	r  v  w  r  |  zrs and r  v  w  r  |  }~r  }r   }r   }}r  }}r   pqrtu  zrs, respectively. Columns 
(3)-(6) report the coefficients on both ISSEDF and Zt with the equation of the form: pqr{tu  v  w  r-y r-yzr{and pqr{tu  v  w  r-y  r-y  |}~r  }r   }r   }}r  }}r   pqrtu  zr{. 
E/A denotes the change in equity and dA/A the change in assets. Controls include the PCA-component for term 
spread and short-term risk-free bond yield and the PCA-component for the lagged returns and credit spread. t-
statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) estimator allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags.  
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In all three cases the excess bond returns and asset growth have a similar relationship while the 
role of equity growth is more unclear; periods of negative asset growth are followed by positive 
excess high yield bond returns. On the contrary periods of high equity growth are followed by 
positive excess high yield bond returns for banks and insurers, but not for broker-dealers. 
However, results for broker-dealers are not statistically significant. In practise these findings 
suggest that banks and insurers have higher equity ratios and their balance sheets decreases 
during credit busts while in during the booms the phenomenon is adverse.   
Last two panels in Table 11 compare two additional set of proxies for the health of bank balance 
sheet: lagged bank stock returns and bank loan loss provisions. In Europe corporates have 
historically relayed heavily on bank financing and this relationship can at least partly explain 
variations in the issuer quality and bond returns. First two columns compare the correlation with 
quarterly measured ISSEDF and columns (4)-(6) show how well lagged bank returns and loan loss 
provisions explain excess high yield bond returns. Loan loss provisions are measured as a 
percentage of total loans. Obtained results suggest that lagged bank stock returns explain the 
variations of ISSEDF well but this does not apply for the loan loss provisions. On the other hand 
columns (3)-(6) shows that periods of high loan loss provisions are followed by negative high 
yield bond returns whereas bank stock returns do not have this kind of relationship.  
The results in this section are twofold.  Results show that on the contrary to Greenwood and 
Hanson (2011), coefficient on ISSEDF attenuate once intermediary balance sheet is controlled. On 
the other hand these findings follow the theory proposed by Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010). 
Further, periods of negative asset growth seem to be associated with following positive excess 
high yield bond returns at a 3-year horizon. At shorter horizons this relationship becomes 
positive. In addition periods of negative asset growth are characterized by higher equity ratios 
compared to credit booms. Intuitively these findings can be explained with the length of the 
credit cycle which has been 6-7 years for last two times (1995-2001 and 2001-2008). For shorter 
periods the cycle has not yet turned and the relationship between assets and excess returns has 
been positive. For longer return horizons the effect is adverse. 
 
69 
 
7.4 Reaching for Yield 
An alternative intermediary-related explanation is based on agency problems. Greenwood and 
Hanson (2011) suggested that time-varying risk premiums are not driven by institutions’ ability 
to take risks, but rather by their willingness to take risk due to agency problems. This view is 
supported by Rajan (2005), who argued that the aggressive compensation structures with limited 
downside and high upside have made investment managers less risk averse. Rajan showed that 
certain institutional investors are keen on reaching the yield when riskless nominal rates are low 
or have recently fallen. Similarly the flat yield curve in 2009-2010 and the high yield credit boom 
in the first half of the year 2011 suggest that investors may have taken excessive risks. In 
addition, Klarman (1991) has argued that the 80’s junk bond boom in U.S. was fuelled by 
investors who still wanted to earn same high nominal rates than in the early 1980’s.  
Empirical evidence on the reaching for yield hypothesis is shown in Table 12 which explores the 
time-series determinants of issuer quality. Quarterly measured level of ISSEDF is regressed with 
the PCA-component containing short-term risk-free bond yield and the term spread. In addition 
Equation (17) controls the effect of past high yield excess returns and past high yield default 
rates. The results of this regression show how well term spread, short-term government bond 
yields, LTM high yield bond returns and past default rates explain variations in ISSEDF. These 
results are presented in Columns (1)-(5). 
HIIEQD    m  hN  hI   hI $  )l    ./)l  o    (17) 
In Equation (17) HIIEQD is the difference between an average expected default probability (EDF) 
quintile of high and low net debt issuers. Term spread and short-term German Government Bond 
yields are grouped into one principal component denoted by h(j  hij   hij  and LTM 
excess high yield bond returns by . DEFHYt denotes speculative-grade default rates in Europe 
recorded and published by Moody’s Investor Service. Error term is denoted by . Also the 
forecasting power of changes is studied. The regression for the changes is presented in equation 
(18) and the subsequent results are presented in columns (6)-(15) of Table 12. 
kHIIEQD    m  khN  hI   hI $  k)l    k./)l  ko  (18) 
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In Equation (18) ∆t denotes the k-quarter difference. Columns (6)-(10) present the results for one 
quarter changes and columns (11)-(15) results for two quarter changes. All results are also 
controlled with macroeconomic variables and lagged equity returns.  
In short, the results in Table 12 are consistent with assumptions that investors are seeking higher 
returns when interest rates are low and yield curve almost flat. For example ISSEDF and interest 
rates have an inverse relationship; ISSEDF rises when short-term risk-free bond yield or the term 
spread are low. However, Column (1) shows that risk free yield for short-term German 
Government Bonds and the term spread between 10- and 2-year bonds capture alone only 16% of 
the variation in ISSEDF. In addition these variables do not capture any of the variation when 
looking at the first difference of changes in colum (6). On the other hand default rates and past 
high yield bond returns capture significantly larger explaining capacity, being almost 56% when 
looking at the level of ISSEDF. However, analogically to the terms spread and short-term bond 
yield, default rates and LTM high yield bond returns capture only a minimal amount of variation 
when looking the first difference.  
Findings described above suggest that the willingness to take risks has a time-varying element 
but it cannot be explained by 1- and 2-quarter changes in short-term risk-free yield, term spread 
or past excess high yield bond returns. On the other hand the changes in default rates have a 
better forecasting power. The explanatory power of the changes improves when the time period is 
lengthened. For example term spread, short-term risk-free bond yields, last twelve month high 
yield bond returns and  past default rates capture 18% of variation of ISSEDF when looking at the 
fourth difference and 24% when analysing the eighth difference. Results for the fourth and eighth 
differences are presented in Appendix 7. 
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Table 12 Determinants of issuer quality 
This Table shows the time series regression of issuer quality ISSEDF on levels and past changes of variables of the form: HIIEQD    m  h(j  hij   hij $  )l   ./)l  o  or  kHIIEQD    m  kh(j  hij   hij $  k)l    k./)l  ko . ISSEDF is the difference between the average EDF quintile of high 
and low net debt issuers. Term spread and short-term German Government Bond yields are grouped into one principal component denoted by h(j  hij   hij . LTM excess 
high yield bond returns are denoted by . DEFHYt denotes speculative-grade default rates in Europe recorded and published by Moody’s Investor Service. Error term is 
denoted by . Results are tested with and without additional controls. These additional controls are lagged equity returns and the principal component of macro-economic 
variables. Columns (1)-(5) show the results for levels, columns (6)-(10) for the one quarter difference and columns (11)-(15) for the half year difference. t-statistics for k-period 
forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West (1987) estimator allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Levels: [y G L,t -y G S,t  +  y G S,t ] 0.13 0.06 -0.08 0.13
[2.97] [1.72] [-1.10] [2.95]
rx HY t -0.04 0.06 0.61 0.30
[-0.20] [0.29] [2.28] [2.21]
DEF t -7.91 -7.15 -6.45 -7.58
[-7.19] [-6.46] [-5.95] [-7.26]
∆ 1 [y G L,t -y G S,t  +  y G S,t ] 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.00
[0.17] [-0.13] [-0.54] [0.02]
∆ 1 rx
HY
t 0.30 0.31 0.58 0.37
[1.05] [0.86] [0.98] [1.08]
∆ 1 DEF t -6.46 -6.56 -5.82 -7.00
[-2.21] [-1.96] [-2.05] [-1.93]
∆ 2 [y G L,t -y G S,t  +  y G S,t ] -0.05 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12
[-0.36] [-0.60] [-0.66] [-0.54]
∆ 2 rx
HY
t 1.05 1.24 1.51 1.29
[1.43] [1.24] [1.30] [1.34]
∆ 2 DEF t -10.14 -10.52 -9.76 -10.22
[-1.72] [-1.81] [-2.63] [-1.71]
Other Controls None None None Lagged 
Equity 
Returns
Economic 
Variables
None None None Lagged 
Equity 
Returns
Economic 
Variables
None None None Lagged 
Equity 
Returns
Economic 
Variables
R 2 0.16 0.56 0.58 0.63 0.61 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.09
1-quarter 
Changes:
2-quarter 
Changes:
∆2ISSEDF∆1 ISSEDFISSEDF
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7.5 Investor Over-extrapolation and Mispricing 
This section considers the possibility that investors’ memory is short and they over-extrapolate 
past defaults or volatility, leading to the time-varying mispricing of corporate bonds and loans. 
As shown in Section 3.2, every company has its optimal leverage level measured in monetary 
terms. However, this balance can be changed if the credit on the markets is exceptionally cheap. 
Simultaneously, following period of low defaults, investors start to believe that the low credit 
quality firms are safer than they really are. This wrong risk analysis decrease the price of the 
credit and when recognizing that the credit is cheap, low quality firms will issue large amount of 
debt making them even more likely to default in the future. This leads to the situation where the 
deteriorating issuer quality forecasts negative excess corporate bond returns.  
Even though extrapolative expectations are not supported by the perfect market hypothesis, there 
are several reasons why over-extrapolation assumptions are realistic. For example Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argued that investors think that the economy evolves according to a 
more or less persistent process. Shleifer and Vishny showed that following low-default 
realizations investors start to believe that the business environment has fundamentally changed 
and the low default environment is more persistent than it truly is. This biased assumption leads 
to low or negative bond returns when the cycle turns. Thus, according to Shleifer and Vishny, the 
lower issuer quality is associated with greater over-optimism about future default rates and lower 
expected returns. 
Table 12 shows that the assumption about low default rates and subsequent deteriorating issuer 
quality really takes place. 1- and 2- quarter changes in the table show that ISSEDF is high 
following periods when default rates have been low and high yield excess returns have been high, 
although the coefficient of determination is low for both changes. For longer time periods, 4- and 
8-quarter changes the statistical significance and the coefficient of determination rises.21  
Following the above discussion it can be suggested that the recent experience of credit market 
investors do play a role in formation of future return expectations but investor react slowly to the 
changes in market conditions. 
                                                 
 
21
 See Appendix 7 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to construct a comprehensive measure of issuer quality and use this 
measure to forecast excess corporate bond returns in European markets. While existing literature 
in corporate finance has mainly focused on identifying reasons why the quantity of credit may 
fluctuate over the business cycle, only little effort has been devoted to connect these credit booms 
and busts to investor returns. Greenwood and Hanson (2011) were the first ones who filled this 
research gap by proving with U.S. data that when issuer quality is low corporate bonds 
subsequently underperform Treasuries. This thesis contributes the existing literature by further 
developing the methodology of Greenwood and Hanson (2011) and by showing empirically that 
the variations in the issuer quality is a defining feature of the credit cycle. 
The empirical part of this thesis focused on studying the European high yield corporate bonds. 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch European Currency High Yield Index was the first high yield 
bond index in Europe launched in December 31st, 1997. This index defined the geographical 
scope, time period and the type of companies studied in the study. The actual company sample 
consisted of non-financial and non-governmental companies headquartered in Europe whose 
market value equals or is more than 100 million euros. The time period observed in this thesis 
was 01/1998-09/2011.  
The primary issuer quality method used in this study was a particular application of Merton’s 
(1974) model which was developed by the proprietors of the KMV Corporation. The model 
compared the credit quality of firms issuing large amount of debt relative to their size to that of 
firms issuing or retiring debt. The comparison was based on periodical changes in debt and thus 
the expected difference in default frequencies between high and low net debt issuers was 
recalculated either annually or quarterly. This ratio was denoted by ISSEDF.  The second quality 
measure, the high yield share, was used to control the results from the ISSEDF calculations. The 
high yield share was formed by using credit ratings assigned to new corporate bond issues. The 
primary source for credit ratings was Moody’s (Moody’s Investors Service, 2011).  
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8.1 Summary of the Results 
The empirical results of this thesis show that when debt issuer quality among European listed 
companies is low or high yield share in bond issuances is high, corporate bonds subsequently 
underperformed German Government Bonds. Between 1998 and 2011 both issuer quality, 
measured with issuer characteristic spread, and the high yield share have had a striking degree of 
predictability and often forecast significantly negative excess bond returns at 3- and 4-year 
horizons. For 1- and 2-year horizons the coefficients on issuer quality measures have attenuated 
once term spread, credit spread, short-term risk-free bond yield and past excess bond returns were 
controlled. 
This thesis shows that the shift towards lower quality bonds decreases, not increases, the actual 
investor returns. This finding rules out the possibility that high yield bond returns would be 
mechanically linked to the composition of bonds in the high yield index. Further, several of the 
empirical findings support the idea that rationally determined price of risk moves in a 
countercyclical fashion. Intermediary balance sheet strength offers one explanation for the time 
varying price of risk. For example the coefficient on ISSEDF attenuates once intermediary balance 
sheet is controlled. The results also show that periods of low nominal interest rates, low term or 
credit spread and low past bond defaults have been followed by high excess returns on corporate 
bonds. These results are difficult to fully explain using rationally time-varying risk aversion or 
other drivers of countercyclical risk premium. Instead, the intermediary frictions and explanations 
in which investors systematically make mistakes in assessing credit quality, offer statistically 
significant reasons for the variation in debt issuer quality. 
Table 13 on the next page presents the more detailed summary of the main results.  
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H1 Aggregate corporate 
debt growth can 
forecast excess bond 
returns. Debt growth 
and excess returns have 
a negative correlation.
H2 Debt issuers quality can 
forecast excess bond 
returns. The relationship 
between quality and the 
expected returns is 
negative.
H3
H4 Periods of strong 
balance sheet of 
financial intermediaries 
are followed by low 
excess returns on 
corporate bonds.
H5 Past default rates and 
bond returns, term 
spread and short term 
risk free yield are 
significant determinants 
of the issuer 
characteristics spread.
Further, emprical results show that issuer quality is disconnected from traditional 
predictors of stock market returns. The negative relationship between issuer 
quality and excess bond returns remains significant even after controlling with 
equity returns and equity volatility at 3- and 4-year horizons. Findings suggest that 
issuer quality captures market movements that are relatively specific to credit 
markets. 
Issuer quality has 
incremental forecasting 
power above term and 
credit spread as well as 
short term risk-free 
interest yield.
Medium support. Issuer quality has incremental forecasting power over and 
above traditional proxies for risk premium at 3- and 4-year horizons. These 
proxies include term spread, credit spread, short term risk-free interest rates and 
last twelve month bond returns. At 1- and 2-year horizons the coefficients on 
issuer quality attenuates once the traditional proxies for risk premium are 
controlled. 
Strong support. Results suggest that periods of negative intermediary asset 
growth are followed positive excess high yield bond returns at 3- and 4-year 
horizons. At shorter horizons this relationship becomes positive. These findings 
can be explained intuitively with the length of the credit cycle.   Especially banks' 
and insurers' balance sheet growth has incremental forecasting power for 
corporate bond returns over and above traditional proxies for risk premium.
Medium support. Past default rates  and changes in past default rates forecast 
the level of ISS EDF at the 1% and the changes of ISS EDF at the 5% significance 
level. On the other hand past bond returns, term spread and short term risk free 
yield do not forecast the level and the changes of ISS EDF with statistically 
significant accuracy.
Strong support.
 Quarterly measured debt issuer quality negatively forecasts 
excess high yield bond returns at 3- and 4-year horizons. Obtained results are 
significant at the 1% significance level. At 1- and 2-year horizons results are 
significant at the 10% level. In this study the debt issuer quality is measured  
primary with issuer characteristic spread between high and low net debt issuers, 
denoted by ISS EDF . The second quality measure is the share of non-financial 
corporate bond issues, showed in logarithmic form and denoted by log(HYS). 
However, results are not sensitive to the method chosen.
Hypothesis Empirical evidence
Medium support. Aggregate corporate debt growth negatively forecasts excess 
high yield bond returns at the 5% significance level, measured with the two-tailed 
t -test. However, the coefficient on aggregate credit growth is attenuated once 
traditional proxies for risk premium are controlled. These proxies include term 
spread, credit spread, short term risk-free interest rates and last twelve month 
bond returns. 
Table 13 Summary of the results 
This Table presents the hypotheses tested in this thesis and the main empirical findings related to them. 
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8.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
This master’s thesis filled an important gap in the existing literature by studying the possibility 
that time-varying investor beliefs or tastes play a role in determining the quantity and allocation 
of credit in Europe. Although the results were solid, the scope of the topic and still evolving high 
yield corporate bond markets prove that there is still ground to cover in the future. 
Probably the most interesting topic for further research arising from this thesis would be the 
intermediaries’ role in credit cycles. Growing literature argues that fluctuations in intermediary 
equity capital or balance sheet health impact risk premium (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; He and 
Krishnamurthy, 2010; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2010; Duffie, 2010). The findings of this thesis 
supported this argument. Unlisted pension insurance companies were excluded from this study 
because of their ownership structure but the importance of these companies to the high yield bond 
markets is significant and might bring some new insight into the matter. Other types of control 
variables could also be investigated, such as country-specific controls. Replicating the study with 
Asian data could also prove to be interesting, although the available data is likely to set some 
limitations, especially in countries with less developed reporting standards. Finally, more 
advanced studies concentrating to time-varying investors’ beliefs and expectations could offer 
additional insight or simply further verify the results found in this study. However, these 
undoubtedly interesting issues are left for the future research. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 Time-series forecasting regressions of excess bond returns   
The reduced-form model described in Chapter 3 suggests that the both coefficients of quality and 
quantity will be negative as long as the variance is bigger than zero. However, the quality 
becomes more important explanatory factor when the variance of non-firm specific variables of 
optimal capital structure grows large or the variance of firm specific determinants approach to 
zero. In order to prove this argument, the assumption that all random variables are independent 
has to be done. And in line with the previous assumption, the exposure of type θ firm to the 
market wide pricing of credit risk (βθ), is expected to be 1 so that  	   	 and 
  	. Expected excess return is a multiplication of expected return on credit assets 
	. Expected credit losses ht and returns E(Rt) are time-varying variables. From  
	 trivially follows that the magnitude of regression coefficients will be larger for high 
default-risk firms than for low default-risk firms, since  	 
	 and βL <βH. 
The coefficient b from univariate forecasting regression of rxt+1 on quality (dH-dL) is: 
m,-+  
,+b ?6	@
"?@,+b ?6	@  F        (E.1)  
In this model the target capital structure has two independent components: at is a common capital 
structure component for all firms and cθ,t is a firm specific component for all firms θ. And for the 
quantity the same coefficient can be presented as follows: 
m,+ 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When equations E.1 and E.2 are regressed together in a multivariate regression the following 
matrix equation is achieved: 
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As the variance of the common variable for all companies grows large (σ2a) or the firm-specific 
component B¥" falls, the aggregate debt issuance becomes less informative and the relative 
issuance (i.e., issuer quality) grows its importance as a forecasting variable. The same can be 
derived for the credit spread. The coefficient b in a univariate and multivariate forecasting 
regression of rxt+1 on spreads st is given by 
m¦  ?6	@"?U@?g@ § F          (E.4) 
    
m,-+m¦ % 
?6	@¨©	C	 2
?U@&,-&+	!*B¥" A        (E.5)  
Where det[V]>0 is the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix of dH-dL and spreads st. 
And analogically to the equation (E.3), when the time-varying expected default probability σ2h 
grows or B¥"  falls in equation (E.5). Credit spread become less and quality more informative 
about excess returns.  
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Appendix 2 Number of firms and observations classified by countries in the final sample 
This Table shows the number of companies and quarterly firm observations in the final sample. Individual Company 
is included into the final sample if there has been sufficient data to calculate expected default probability following 
Bharath and Shumway (2008). When calculated with quarterly data, 4 continuous quarters of continuous data are 
required. 
 
 
Country Number of firms Quarterly observations
Germany 223 4,168
Italy 148 2,699
Sweden 117 2,443
Turkey 112 1,944
Poland 105 1,674
Greece 84 1,425
Spain 75 1,532
Finland 72 1,864
Norway 70 1,502
Russia 52 425
Denmark 47 1,029
Netherlands 40 812
Austria 31 677
France 29 500
Portugal 28 706
Switzerland 25 509
United Kingdom 19 406
Belgium 13 308
Luxembourg 13 285
Hungary 11 241
Czech Republic 7 146
Ireland 4 77
Lithuania 4 60
Iceland 3 71
Slovakia 1 12
Cyprus 1 21
Slovenia 1 14
Malta 1 17
1,336 25,567
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Appendix 3 Compilation of univariate regressions 
This Table shows different variations for ISSEDF and log(HYS). ISSEDF(annual, not lagged) is the normal annual issuer quality forecasting regression without lagging, ISSEDF(annual) describes 
the same data but is lagged by one year, ISSEDF(quarterly, not lagged) is the not lagged quarterly issuer quality regression, ISSEDF(quarterly, not lagged, dummy) is the quarterly regression function 
which accounts possible quarter specific variations, ISSEDF(quarterly) is the quarterly regression lagged by one quarter, ISSEDF(quarterly, annualized debt change, not lagged) is one quarter not lagged 
regression with rolling 12-month debt change and ISSEDF(quarterly, annualized debt change) is one quarter lagged regression with rolling 12-month debt change. log(HYS)(annual, not lagged) is the 
annual not lagged high yield bond share of total issuance, log(HYS)(annual) is the annual high yield share lagged by one year, log(HYS)(quarterly, not lagged) is the quarterly high yield share, 
log(HYS)(quarterly, not lagged dummy) is the quarterly high yield share accounting for the quarter specific factors, log(HYS)(quarterly) is the one quarter lagged function, log(HYS)(quarterly, not lagged, 
annualized debt change)
 is the 12-month average high yield share of total issues and finally, log(HYS)(quarterly, annualized debt change) is the lagged 12-month average high yield share of total issues. t-
statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation up to k-lags. 
 
b [t] R2 b [t] R2 b [t] R2 b [t] R2 b [t] R2
X t =ISS EDF (annual, not lagged) -0.16 [-0.77] 0.06 -0.30 [-3.95] 0.20 -0.62 [-3.99] 0.47 -0.50 [-6.68] 0.48 -0.10 [-0.44] 0.02
X t-1 =ISS EDF (annual) -0.30 [-4.32] 0.21 -0.22 [-1.66] 0.08 -0.18 [-1.86] 0.04 0.14 [0.75] 0.04 0.10 [0.97] 0.02
X t =ISS EDF (quarterly, not lagged) 0.04 [0.53] 0.00 -0.06 [-0.96] 0.02 -0.15 [-1.61] 0.06 -0.04 [-0.58] 0.01 -0.04 [-0.49] 0.01
X t =ISS EDF (quarterly, not lagged, dummy) 0.06 [0.76] 0.01 -0.07 [-0.85] 0.02 -0.17 [-1.27] 0.29 -0.06 [-1.12] 0.04 -0.07 [-0.82 0.03
X t-1 =ISS EDF (quarterly) -0.08 [-1.42] 0.02 -0.07 [-1.08] 0.01 -0.12 [-0.95] 0.04 -0.02 [-0.37] 0.00 0.04 [0.46] 0.01
X t =ISS EDF (quarterly, annualized debt change, not lagged) -0.04 [-0.44] 0.01 -0.12 [-1.86] 0.07 -0.17 [-1.66] 0.10 -0.23 [-3.29] 0.32 -0.21 [-4.09] 0.25
X t-1 =ISS EDF (quarterly, annualized debt change) -0.11 [-1.08] 0.05 -0.11 [-1.90] 0.07 -0.19 [-1.84] 0.12 -0.27 [-3.14] 0.43 -0.20 [-3.45] 0.23
X t =log(HYS)  (annual, not lagged) 0.40 [3.08] 0.46 -0.07 [-0.32] 0.01 -0.37 [-1.48] 0.14 -0.52 [-5.65] 0.36 -0.66 [-5.17] 0.61
X t-1 =log(HYS)  (annual) -0.07 [-0.32] 0.07 -0.29 [-3.09] 0.13 -0.74 [-3.03] 0.43 -0.78 [-7.64] 0.78 -0.49 [-3.40] 0.38
X t =log(HYS)  (quarterly, not lagged) 0.23 [4.22] 0.49 0.04 [0.38] 0.01 -0.14 [-1.73] 0.11 -0.11 [-1.96] 0.11 -0.12 [-1.53] 0.09
X t =log(HYS)  (quarterly, not lagged, dummy) 0.24 [3.96] 0.50 0.04 [0.39] 0.01 -0.15 [-1.69] 0.12 -0.12 [-1.88] 0.14 -0.12 [-1.34] 0.12
X t-1 =log(HYS)  (quarterly) 0.22 [4.49] 0.42 0.00 [-0.03] 0.00 -0.14 [-1.60] 0.11 -0.12 [-1.70] 0.12 -0.16 [-1.98] 0.16
X t =log(HYS)  (quarterly, not lagged, annualized debt change) 0.41 [6.64] 0.49 -0.13 [-0.96] 0.05 -0.32 [-1.91] 0.18 -0.33 [-2.21] 0.27 -0.50 [-3.54] 0.51
X t-1 =log(HYS)  (quarterly, annualized debt change) 0.29 [3.44] 0.24 -0.23 [-1.76] 0.15 -0.38 [-2.37] 0.25 -0.41 [-2.92] 0.38 -0.56 [-4.87] 0.64
LTM High Yield Returns 1-year High Yield Returns 2-year High Yield Returns 3-year High Yield Returns 4-year High Yield Returns
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Appendix 4 Robustness check for the time period used in the study 
This Table shows the univariate regressions for the log(HYS) of the form: k)l    m  n-  ok where the 
dependent variable k)l 	is the cumulative 3-year excess return on high yield bonds calculated with Bank of 
America (BoFa) Merrill Lynch European Currency High Yield Bond - Index. In Panel B and C, the dependent 
variable is the cumulative 3-year excess return on BBB- and AAA- rated corporate bonds calculated with BoFa 
Merrill Lynch Emu Corporate non-financial BBB- and AAA- rated bond indexes, respectively. X denotes log(HYS) 
and ok is the error term. The left side of the table presents the high-yield share calculated for 01/2001-
09/2011.This time period is the maximum length for ISSEDF calculations. The right side of the table presents the 
result for the hold time period the high yield index data has been available (01/1998-09/2011). t-statistics are based 
on Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation up to k-lags. 
 
 
 
 
 
1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year
b -0.23 -0.38 -0.41 -0.56 -0.28 -0.45 -0.39 -0.52
[t] [-1.76] [-2.36] [-2.93] [-4.87] [-2.29] [-2.81]        [-3.20] [-5.33]
R 2 0.15 0.25 0.38 0.62 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.52
b -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
[t] [-1.94] [-2.60] [-2.97] [-2.85] [-1.67] [-2.21] [-1.42] [-1.43]
R 2 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.11
b -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
[t] [-0.97] [-0.70] [-0.40] [-3.37] [-1.11] [-0.75] [-0.30] [-2.98]
R 2 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.38 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.29
Panel C: AAA Excess Returns (rxAAA)
X t-1 =log(HYS) (quarterly, annualized debt change) 2001-2011 X t-1 =log(HYS) (quarterly, annualized debt change) 1998-2011
Panel A: High Yield Excess Returns (rxHY)
Panel B: BBB Excess Returns (rxBBB)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Issuer Quality log(HYS)  (quarterly) -0.39 -0.32
[-3.20] [-3.24]
Agg. Debt growth ∆D Agg /D Agg -0.10 -0.06
[-2.18] [-1.47]
Low EDF ∆D 1 /D 1 -0.09 -0.02 -0.11
[-2.31] [0.02] [-2.51]
2 ∆D 2 /D 2 -0.12
[-2.26]
3 ∆D 3 /D 3 -0.10
[-2.52]
4 ∆D 4 /D 4 -0.10
[-1.83]
High EDF ∆D 5 /D 5
-0.11 -0.11
[-2.59] [-1.58]
High-Low ∆D 5 /D 5  - ∆D 1 /D 1 -0.06 -0.11
[-1.00] [-1.58]
R 2 0.26 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.33 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.04 0.29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Issuer Quality log(HYS)  (quarterly) -0.36 -0.36
[-3.53] [-4.21]
Agg. Debt growth ∆D Agg /D Agg -0.09 -0.02
[-1.70] [-0.69]
Low EDF ∆D 1 /D 1 -0.07 0.00 -0.11
[-1.54] [-0.00] [-2.21]
2 ∆D 2 /D 2 -0.14
[-2.04]
3 ∆D 3 /D 3 -0.09
[-2.08]
4 ∆D 4 /D 4 -0.11
[-1.50]
High EDF ∆D 5 /D 5 -0.11 -0.11
[-2.17] [-1.47]
High-Low ∆D 5 /D 5  - ∆D 1 /D 1 -0.05 -0.11
[-0.83] [-1.47]
R 2 0.37 0.24 0.48 0.19 0.34 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.29
Panel A: Univariate
Panel B: Multivariate
Appendix 5 Quantity, quality and future return to credit 
 This Table shows the forecasting power of quantity and quality to future returns on credit. Quarterly measured trailing 12-month univariate regression is of the form: 	pqrstu  v w  xr-y  zrs and time-series controlled multivariate regressions is of the form: pqr{tu  v  w  xr-y  |  }~r  }r   }r   }}r  }}r   pqrtu  zr{. pqr{tu  
denotes the cumulative 3-year excess return on high yield bonds and  Xt-1 stands for quarterly measured log(HYS). Term spread and short-term German Government Bond yields are 
grouped into one principal component denoted by }~r  }r   }r . Credit spread and LTM excess high yield bond returns form another principal component denoted by	}}r }}r   pqrtu=		  zrs is the error term.  ∆DAgg/DAgg is the annual percentage change in total debt for companies and ∆Dk/Dk denotes the aggregate debt growth of quintiles. Panel A 
shows regressions without and Panel B with principal component controls. t-statistics are based 
on Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation up to k-lags. 
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Appendix 6 ARMA-models for the univariate regressions 
This Table presents Aike’s and Bayesian information criteria (Burnham and Anderson, 2002) for log excess returns 
on speculative-grade bonds on debt issuer quality ISSEDF and log(HYS) of the form: k)l    m  n-  ok. 
The dependent variable k)l 	is the cumulative 3-year excess return on high yield bonds calculated with Bank of 
America (BoFa) Merrill Lynch European Currency High Yield Bond - Index. ok is the error term. In the upper part 
of the table X denotes ISSEDF and in the lower part log(HYS).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0.36 0.56 0.49 1 0.49 0.69 0.62
2 -0.27 0.40 0.41 2 -0.14 0.53 0.54
3 0.12 0.51 0.57 3 0.25 0.64 0.70
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 -0.39 -0.44 -0.40 1 -0.28 -0.33 -0.29
2 -0.46 0.14 0.17 2 -0.35 0.25 0.28
3 0.04 0.12 0.29 3 0.15 0.23 0.40
AIC SBIC
ISS EDF(quarterly, annual debt change)
log(HYS) (quarterly, annnual debt change)
AIC SBIC
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Appendix 7 Determinants of the issuer quality 
This Table shows past changes of past returns, term spread, short-term interest rates and default rates of the form:  kHIIEQD    m  kh(j  hij   hij $  k)l    k./)l  ko . ISSEDF is the difference 
between the average EDF quintile of high and low debt issuers. Term spread and short-term German Government 
Bond yields are grouped into one principal component denoted by h(j  hij   hij  and LTM excess high yield 
bond returns by . DEFHYt denotes speculative-grade default rates in Europe recorded and published by Moody’s 
Investor Service. Error term is denoted by . Results are tested with and without controls. Both lagged equity 
returns and the principal component of macro-economic variables are used to control the results. Columns (17)-(21) 
show the results for one year (4 quarters) difference and columns (22)-(26) for the two years difference (8 quarters). 
t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West (1987) estimator allowing for serial 
correlation up to k-lags. 
 
 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
∆ 4 [y G L,t -y G S,t  +  y G S,t ] 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.00
[0.61] [-0.22] [-0.12] [-0.03]
∆ 4 rx
HY
t 1.79 1.84 1.67 1.66
[1.67] [1.50] [1.44] [1.32]
∆ 4 DEF t -25.49 -26.13 -25.35 -24.77
[-2.62] [-2.21] [-2.25] [-2.44]
∆ 8 [y G L,t -y G S,t  +  y G S,t ] 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12
[1.33] [0.99] [1.00] [1.26]
∆ 8 rx
HY
t 1.34 1.17 1.32 1.08
[2.15] [1.67] [1.62] [1.47]
∆ 8 DEF t -19.50 -15.41 -15.49 -15.93
[-4.39] [-2.40] [-2.33] [-2.42]
Other Controls None None None Lagged 
Equity 
Returns
Economic 
Variables
None None None Lagged 
Equity 
Returns
Economic 
Variables
R 2 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.05 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.26
4-quarter 
Changes:
8-quarter 
Changes:
∆4ISSEDF ∆8ISSEDF
